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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of essays relating to the three important real estate research
topics: spatial statistics, mortgages, and real estate investment trusts (REITs). In the first essay,
“Spatial Distribution of Retail Sales,” we apply retail gravity models to examine the spatial
distribution of retail sales for a retail chain in the Houston market. Unlike previous empirical
studies, our study models both the spatial dependencies among both consumers and retailers. Our
results show both the spatial dependencies have significant impacts on the estimates of
parameters in retail gravity models. Contrary to the suggestions of Guitschi (1981) as well as
Eppli and Shilling (1996), our results show the importance of the distance parameter in retail
gravity models may be understated about 68%. Thus, previous studies may overestimate the
deterministic extent of trade areas and, thus understate the importance of good locations.
The second essay, “Local Housing Prices and Mortgage Refinancing in US Cities,” has
implications the valuation of mortgages, in particular mortgage-backed securities (MBS). This
essay provides additional evidence that house prices significantly impact aggregate refinancing
and thus directly impact mortgage termination. Previous studies typically focus on the effect of
negative appreciation on refinancing. In contrast to previous studies, this essay provides
empirical evidence that a positive house price appreciation may motivate borrowers to refinance
for capital structure-based or consumption reasons.
The third essay, “Monitoring and Dividend Policy for REITs under Asymmetric
Information,” examines the interaction between monitoring and two competing explanations for
REIT dividend policy under asymmetric information. Specifically, the REIT empirical literature
offers two competing theories for the level of dividend payouts under asymmetric information.
Wang, Erickson, and Gau (1993) confirm the agency-cost theories. Bradley, Capozza, and

v

Seguin (1998) support the signaling explanations dominating agency cost explanations. In this
essay, we demonstrate that by introducing proxies for taxable income and monitoring, we
provide evidence that supports agency cost explanations for ineffectively monitored REITs.
Furthermore, in contrast to Bradley, Capozza, and Seguin (1998), we show agency cost
explanations dominate signaling explanations for these REITs.

vi

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Over the past 14 years, The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics (JREFE) has
devoted special issues to important research topics of real estate.1 In particular JREFE devoted
its volume 23 number 2 published in year 2001 to mortgage modeling, its volume 20 number 2
published in year 2000 to real estate investment trusts (REITs), and its volume 17 number 1
published in year 1998 to spatial statistics and real estate. Currently, JREFE has a second
forthcoming special issue on spatial statistics and real estate.
Other real estate journals also reflect the importance of these three research topics.
Particularly The Journal of Housing Research (JHR) published a special issue (volume 6 issue 1)
on mortgage-backed securities (MBS) pricing in 1995. The Journal of Real Estate Research
(JRER) devoted its volume 6 number 3 to REITs in 1998.2 In year 2002 The Journal of Real
Estate Portfolio Management (JREPM) also published a special issue (volume 7 number 1) on
REITs.
This dissertation consists of essays relating to the three important real estate research
topics: spatial statistics, mortgages, and REITs. The first essay is an empirical application of
spatial statistics to retail location. The second essay is about housing prices and mortgage
refinancing, and the third essay is about dividend policies of real estate investment trusts.
The first essay, “Spatial Distribution of Retail Sales,” applies retail gravity models to
examine the spatial distribution of retail sales for a retail chain in the Houston market. Although
many studies have empirically examined the concept of retail gravitation, the literature has
1

JREFE published only 12 special issues in its total 78 issues from 1988 (volume 1, issue 1) to 2001 (volume 25,
issue 1) (JREFE, 2002).
2
REITs and mortgages were ranked the 6th and 10th popular research topics in the JRER from 1986 to 1996 (Jud,
1996).
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inconsistent evidence on the importance of distance between consumers and retailers (Mejia and
Benjamin, 2002). In particular, Guitschi (1981) as well as Eppli and Shilling (1996) suggest that
the distance parameter may be significantly overstated in most previous retail gravity studies.
Different from previous empirical studies, this essay models both the spatial
dependencies among consumers and stores. The essay shows both the spatial dependencies have
significant impacts on the estimates of parameters in retail gravity models. Contrary to Guitschi’s
(1981) as well as Eppli and Shilling’s (1996) suggestions, the results of the first essay show the
importance of the distance parameter in most retail gravity models may be understated. In
particular, this essay applies spatial statistics and shows the Ordinary Least Square (OLS)
underestimates the distance parameter about 68% compared with the spatial simultaneous
autoregressive error (SAR in errors).
The title of the second essay is “Local Housing Prices and Mortgage Refinancing in US
Cities.” This essay has implications the valuation of mortgages, in particular mortgage-backed
securities (MBS). The proper valuation of MBS rests on the ability to model mortgage
termination risk. Mortgage termination risk consists of default risk, refinancing risk, and
mobility-related prepayment risk. Recent MBS valuation models have recognized that house
prices are another important determinant of mortgage termination in addition to interest rates.
Furthermore, refinancing appears to be the strongest means for house prices to affect mortgage
termination (Mattery and Wallace, 1998). Nevertheless few studies investigate the relation
between house price changes and aggregate refinancing activities. Two exceptions are Mattery
and Wallace (1998) and Bennett, Keane, and Mosser (1999).
Mattery and Wallace (1998) provide evidence that a decrease in house prices
significantly decreases county-level aggregate refinancing activities in California. On the other
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hand, Bennett, Keane, and Mosser (1999) find no significant relation between house prices with
the seasonally adjusted Mortgage Banker Association Refinance Index. The second essay
provides evidence that an increase in house prices has a significant positive effect on city-level
aggregate refinancing activities. Furthermore, the essay provides empirical evidence that house
price appreciation may motivate borrowers to refinance for capital structure-based reasons.
The third essay, “Monitoring and Dividend Policy for REITs under Asymmetric
Information,” examines the interaction between monitoring and two competing explanations for
REIT dividend policy under asymmetric information. Specifically, both signaling and agencycost explanations have received empirical support in the REIT empirical literature. Wang,
Erickson, and Gau (1993) provide evidence supporting the agency-cost explanation on REITs,
while Bradely, Capozza, and Seguin (1998) provide evidence supporting the signaling
explanation. Furthermore, Bradely, Capozza, and Seguin (1998) also show that signaling
explanations dominate agency cost explanations for REITs.
By introducing proxies for taxable income and monitoring, this essay provides evidence
that supports agency cost explanations for ineffectively monitored REITs. Furthermore, in
contrast to Bradley, Capozza, and Seguin (1998), we show agency cost explanations dominate
signaling explanations for these REITs. In other words, agency-cost explanations dominate when
effective non-dividend monitoring does not exist. This result is consistent with Easterbrook’s
(1984) rationale of substitution among agency-cost control devices.
1.1 References
Bennett, Paul, Frank Keane, and Patricia C. Mosser. (1999). “Mortgage Refinancing and the
Concentration of Mortgage Coupons,” Current Issues in Economics and Finance 5, 1-6.
Bradley, Michael, Dennis R. Capozza, and Paul J. Seguin. (1998). “Dividend Policy and Cashflow Uncertainty,” Real Estate Economics 26, 555-580.
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Dubin, Robin, R. Kelley Pace, and Thomas G. Thibodeau. (1999). “Spatial Autoregression
Techniques for Real Estate Data,” Journal of Real Estate Literature 7, 79-95.
Eppli, Mark J., and James D. Shilling. (1996). “How Critical Is a Good Location to a Regional
Shopping Center?” The Journal of Real Estate Research 12, 459-468.
Gautschi, David A. (1981). “Specification of Patronage Models for Retail Center Choice,”
Journal of Marketing Research 18, 162-174.
Jud, G. Donald. (1996). “The Journal of Real Estate Research: A Ten-Year Review,” The
Journal of Real Estate Research 12, 249-313.
Mattery, Joe, and Nancy Wallace. (1998). “Housing Prices and the (In)stability of Mortgage
Prepayment Models: Evidence from California,” FRBSF Working Papers No. 98-05, 1-49.
Pace, R. Kelley, and Ronalid Barry. (1997). “Sparse Spatial Autoregressions,” Statistics and
Probability Letters 33, 291-297.
The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics. (2002). http://www.jrefe.org.
Wang, Ko, and John Erickson, and George W. Gau. (1993). “Dividend Polices and Dividend
Effects for Real Estate Investment Trusts,” Journal of the American Real Estate and Urban
Economics Association 21, 185-201.
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CHAPTER 2
SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF RETAIL SALES
2.1 Introduction
When considering opening a new store, retail chain store executives take a holistic view
of market performance across their entire store network. In particular, they wish to avoid opening
a profitable store at the expense of existing stores. To avoid such a loss, the executives need the
spatial distribution information of customers and competitors to accurately define trade areas for
site selection. In addition, managers of individual stores could use the spatial distribution of
customers and competitors to promote sales. From an overall market perspective, the technology
of forecasting sales can affect the location premia of retail properties.
We apply retail gravitation notions to examine empirically the spatial distribution of retail
sales. 1 Seventy years ago Reilly (1931; cited in Huff, 1965) published his seminal proposition,
known as “the law of retail gravitation.” Retail gravity models draw an analogy with Newton’s
gravitational law to account for human behaviors related to shopping activities. In retail gravity
models, various store features such as size attract customers, just as larger astronomical bodies
have greater gravitational force. Distance between the customers and the store diminishes this
attraction, just as gravity diminishes with distance. The simple functional form suggested by the
analogy with gravity provided the prime contribution of Reilly’s (1931; cited in Brown, 1992)
work.
Many studies have empirically examined this concept of retail gravitation.2 Nevertheless
the literature often differs on the importance of the distance between retailers and consumers

1

Hardin and Wolverton (2001) provide evidence that retail gravitation affects rental rates.
Examples of these studies are Gautschi (1981), Okoruwa, Nourse, and Terza (1988 and 1994; ONT hereafter), and
Eppli and Shilling (1996).

2

5

(Mejia and Benjamin, 2002). In particular, Guitschi (1981) as well as Eppli and Shilling (1996)
suggest that the distance parameter may be significantly overstated in previous retail gravity
research.
Studies have recognized that the spatial distribution of consumers and retailers influence
the calibration outcomes of retail gravity models (Brown 1992). However, the existing studies of
retail gravity assume no spatial dependencies among consumers and retailers, as well as
independence among errors after controlling for distance. Therefore, the estimated parameters in
the existing studies may reflect not only the nature of the spatial interaction between retailers and
consumers but also their spatial distribution (Brown, 1992).
In this study, we apply spatial statistics to estimate a retail gravity model. 3 In particular,
we model the spatial dependencies with a spatial simultaneous autoregressive error (SAR in
errors) model among both consumers and retailers in a gravity model. The spatial dependency
among retailers reflects important retailer and consumer behaviors in the choice of retail
shopping trips, such as the clustering of heterogeneous retailers and the agglomeration of
homogeneous retailers at site. The spatial dependence among consumers reflects the spatial
autocorrelation of consumer shopping behavior arising from unobservable variables such as
information sharing among consumers. To estimate the dependencies, we employ the spatial
simultaneous autoregressive error model (Ord, 1975) to capture the spatial dependencies among
consumers and stores.
Our results confirm the importance of modeling both the spatial dependencies in a retailgravity model. When the spatial dependence among consumers (retailers) is explicitly taken into
account, the estimated parameters of variables pertaining to consumers (retailers) change their
magnitude considerably, and several reverse their signs. Compared with SAR in errors, OLS
3

Porojan (2001) applied spatial statistics to estimate gravity models of international trade flows.
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significantly underestimates the magnitude of the distance parameter. Contrary to Guitschi
(1981) as well as Eppli and Shilling (1996), the results show the importance of the distance
parameter may be understated about 68% in previous studies. Our results imply previous studies
may overestimate the deterministic extent of trade areas for retail stores, and thus understate the
importance of good locations.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses retail gravitation and
the spatial dependencies; section 3 describes retail sales data and empirical methodology; section
4 presents the empirical results; and section 5 concludes with the key results.
2.2 Retail Gravitation and Spatial Dependencies
Social scientists have drawn an analogy between the spatial interaction of people and
Newton’s law of gravity in physics. Approximately seventy years ago, Reilly (1931; cited in
Brown, 1992) formally applied the Newton’s gravity concept to retail geography. After that,
many models of shopping behavior have been developed based on the concept of retail
gravitation.4 Nevertheless, most of these models, in their general forms, relate the interaction
(shopping trips or expenditures) between retail store b and consumer c, I bc , to the
characteristics of store b, mb , and the characteristics of consumer c, mc , and the separation
measurement between b and c, d bc , in the manner of Equation (1):
I bc = λ mbβb mcβ c dbcβ d

(1)

where λ is a constant, and β b , β c , and β d are parameters to be estimated.5
Many earlier studies include only store size and distance in their gravity models.6
Examples are Huff’s (1962) Lakshmanan and Hansen’s (1965) models. Using survey data of
4

See Brown (1992) for a list of studies of retail gravity models.
Gravity models in this form can be applied to all sorts of spatial interaction behavior such as retail shopping, and
population migration (Fotheringham and Webber, 1980).

5
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shopping trips, Guitschi (1981) calibrated Huff’s (1962) variation of Equation (1). He suggested
that previous studies omitting other retail center variables might overstate the distance parameter
in retail gravity models. Stanley and Sewall (1976) calibrated Huff’s variation on single stores in
a retail chain. Same to Kolter (1984, cited in Stanely and Sewall), they did not find that store size
contributed significantly to estimates of store patronage. They, as well as Kolter (1984, cited in
Stanely and Sewall), conclude that Huff’s model is of limited value in estimating sales potential
for single stores. Obtaining actual sales data, Eppli and Shiling (1996) calibrate Lakshmanan and
Hansen’s (1965) variant with an interactive approach and OLS. They find store location
(proximity to the competition) is of little importance and conclude the distance parameter for
retail gravity models may be significantly overstated.7
More recent research incorporates more characteristics of stores and consumers in retail
gravity models. For example, Okoruwa, Nourse, and Terza (1988 and 1994) include retail center
variables such as age and type, as well as economic and demographic characteristics of shoppers
in estimating shopping trip frequencies obtained from a survey. Okoruwa, Nourse, and Terza
(1988 and 1994) calibrate Equation (1) with a Possion regression. Contradicting the typical
hypothesis of retail gravity models, they find that retail center size exerts a negative influence on
patronization rates.
Some studies have recognized that the spatial distribution of origins and destinations
influence the calibration outcomes of gravity-type models that study the interaction of
individuals between two places (Curry, 1972; Brown 1992). The estimated parameters of
gravity-type models reflect not only the nature of the spatial interaction between origins and
destinations, but also their spatial distribution (Curry, Griffith, and Sheppard, 1975 and 1976;

6
7

See Okoruwa, Nourse, and Terza (1988) for a list of such studies.
In most retail gravity models, location is consumers’ distance to retailers.
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Fotheringham and Webber, 1980; Brown, 1992). In particular, Curry (1972) shows both the
spatial dependencies among origins and destinations can influence the estimated parameters of
gravity-type models. When the spatial dependencies are confounded with the estimated
parameters, their values are not comparable from place to place (CGS, 1975). In other words the
calibration results from a particular area are not applicable to anywhere else because the
parameters do not measure their own “true” value.
In the context of retail shopping, the spatial dependence among destinations is the spatial
dependence among stores. This spatial dependence reflects the clustering of retailers,
accessibility, visibility of a retail site, and retail demand externalities within a shopping center.
Clustering among heterogeneous retailers reflects multi-purpose shopping behavior of consumers
to reduce total travel costs, and clustering of homogeneous retailers reflects comparisonshopping behavior (Eppli and Benjamin, 1994).8 Studies have established the importance of
these retailer and consumer behaviors in the choice of retail shopping trips (Eppli and Benjamin,
1994). Nevertheless, most of previous empirical studies did not incorporate these behaviors in
retail gravity models.9
On the other hand, the spatial dependence among consumers equates to the spatial
dependence among origins in the context of retail shopping. This dependence reflects the
unobservable shopping patterns of a neighborhood caused by clustering of similar consumer
populations and similar shopping environments. Clustering of similar consumer populations
reflects that individuals with a similar preference tend to live together geographically. The
workplaces of the consumer populations who live together also tend to cluster together.

8

Most of gravity models assume that consumers shop from fixed points (e.g., their places of residence) and buy just
one type of good or service per shopping trip (Carter, 1993).
9
One exception is Nevin and Houston (1980, cited in Hardin and Wolverton, 2001) who include multipurpose
shopping opportunities in their gravity model.

9

Therefore, they share shopping information easily and face similar shopping environments such
as transportation network available to retailers. However, previous studies did not incorporate the
unobservable shopping patterns in retail gravity models.

2.3 Retail Sales Data and Empirical Methodology
This section contains two parts. Part 1 describes the retail sales data and census data
employed in this study. Part 2 presents the empirical methodology used to calibrate the retail
gravity equation.

2.3.1 Retail Sales Data and Census Data
A retail consultant provided individual store and consumer data of a retail chain in the
Houston market. The consumer data are for each household who shopped at a particular store.
The data are the total dollar amounts each household spent at each individual store for the year
2000, and the block group where each household resides. We aggregate the data to the blockgroup level and calculate retail sales in a block group for each store ( Salescs ). The individual
store data are total store sales in year 2000 ( storesales ) and in year 1999 ( lagged storesales ),
store size in square feet ( storesize ), type of shopping center where each store resides
( strip, pad , or mall ), age of the shopping center ( centerage ), and longitude ( lons ) and latitude
( lats ) of each store.10

We supplement the retail sales data with 1990 census data and 1998 census estimates. In
particular, we obtain census data relevant to the total potential expenditure for a block-group.
The data are median medical supplies expenditure ( medicalsupp ), median household income
( medhsinc ), median house value ( medhsval ), median house age ( houseage ), total population
( totpop ), land area ( arealand ), median age ( medage ), white population ( popwhite ), and
10

A strip (linear) shopping center consists of a line of stores with a pedestrian walk along the storefronts. A pad
(cluster) center is a group of freestanding retail sites linked together by pedestrian walkways.
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female population ( females ). Median house value, median house age, and land area are for
1990, while the other data are for 1998. We also obtain the longitude ( lon ) and latitude ( lat ) of
each block-group to calculate retailer distance to consumers. Specifically, we compute the
distance that consumers travel from their block group to the stores ( distancecs ). We also obtain
average travel time to work ( l_trvtim ) for 1990 from 1990 census data to take into account
shopping originating from places of employment.
Geographically, the Houston market covers Baytown, Friendswood, Houston, Humble,
Lake Jackson, Sugar Land, and Texas City. The retail chain has 14 stores in the Houston market.
Twelve stores are located in shopping malls, one in a strip shopping center, and one in a pad-type
shopping center.
Table 2.1 presents the descriptive statistics of the data used in this study. On average a
store had $1,846 of retail sales in a block group. Retail sales in a block group vary widely from
only $5 to $113,323. This variation indicates retail sales do not uniformly originate over space.
Figures 2.1-1 to 2.1-4 map the spatial distribution of retail sales for one of the 14 stores. Clearly,
retail sales cluster together. This clustering indicates a potential spatial dependence among
consumers. The distance among retailers and consumers is measured using the Euclidean matrix.
Over fifty percent of the consumers traveled less than 10.49 miles to the store where they
shopped from their residence. Some consumers lived only 0.15 mile away from the store they
shop. Some consumers lived over 712 miles away in Texas.11
For the 14 stores in our study, total store sales were stable over year 1999 and year 2000.
A store on average generated about the $1.3 million total sales a year. The stores generated sales
between about $0.5 million and $2 million. Figure 2.2 maps total store sales for the 14 stores
11

The longest straight-line distance of Texas is 801 miles in a general north-south direction and 773 miles in a
general east-west direction (Texas Almanac, 2001).
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics
Variables

Label

Retail sales ($)

salesbc

Distance (miles)
Store sales ($)
Lagged store sales ($)
Shopping center age (years)
Store size (square feet)
Medical supplies expenditure ($1000)
Median household income ($)
Median house value ($)
Median house age (years)
Travel time to work (minutes)
Population (persons)
Land area (0.001 square kilometers)
Median age (year)
White population (persons)
Female population (persons)

distancebc
storesales
lagged storesales
centerage
storesize
medicalsupp
medhsinc
medhsval
houseage
l _ trvtim
totpop
arealand
medage
popwhite
females

Mean

Std Dev.

Median

Minimum

Maximum

1,846.06

3,827.73

524.00

5.00

113,323.00

22.29
1,339,666.71

45.99
380,706.15

10.49
1,315,324.50

0.15
505,601.00

712.26
2,030,448.00

1,324,174.57
10.36
4,578.79

383,531.07
3.12
929.01

1,268,676.50
10.88
4,511.00

515,538.00
4.87
3,157.00

1,853,128.00
15.75
6,612.00

61.67
45,706.62
71,301.38

42.60
24,808.02
57,253.59

51.00
39,328.00
57,100.00

3.00
11,976.00
14,999.00

782.00
150,000.00
500,001.00

31.98

11.94

29.00

10.00

61.00

24.53
1,837.00
10,428.72

6.28
1,007.17
33,201.48

24.40
1,627.00
1,125.00

6.90
70.00
60.00

54.10
11,125.00
446,589.00

33.57

6.50

32.70

11.20

75.00

1,407.99

876.56

1,282.00

5.00

10,135.00

927.87

507.12

826.00

43.00

6,019.00

12

Figure 2.1-1 Spatial Distribution of Retail Sales

Figure 2.1-2 Spatial Distribution of Retail Sales
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Figure 2.1-3 Spatial Distribution of Retail Sales

Figure 2.1-4 Spatial Distribution of Retail Sales
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Figure 2.2 Spatial Distribution of Store Sales
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over space. Store sales clearly spatially cluster together. This clustering indicates a potential
spatial dependence among store locations. The average store size was 4,579 square feet. The
smallest store had 3,157 square feet, and the largest store had 6,612 square feet. The average
shopping center age was 10 years. The newest center opened 5 years ago, and the oldest center
opened 15 years ago.
There are 2,977 block-groups in Texas whose residents shopped at the stores in the study
during 2000. Residents in a block group spent on average $62,000 on medical supplies in 1998.
The median household income was $33,688 a year. The median house value was $71,000.
Residents on average spent 25 minutes traveling from their home to work. On average a block
group has 1,387 residents and 10 square kilometers in area. The median age of a resident was of
34 years old. A block group on average has 993 white residents and 699 female residents.
2.3.2 Empirical Methodology
This overall section presents the empirical methodology. Part 1 briefly describes a SAR
in errors model. Part 2 provides the detail on the construction of the spatial weight matrix for this
study. Part 3 discusses the maximum likelihood computations. Part 4 shows the empirical model
for the retail gravity model.
2.3.2-1 A SAR in Errors Model
We describe a SAR in errors model, mainly following the notation of Pace and Gilley
(1997). When errors exhibit spatial autocorrelation, a SAR in errors model uses the difference
between the dependent variable and the model prediction from nearby observations to correct the
usual prediction of the dependent variable:
Y = X β + α D(Y − X β ) + ε

16

(2)

where D is an n × n spatial weighting matrix and ε is an n × 1 vector of error terms. To prevent
an observation from predicting itself, D has zeros on its diagonal. To facilitate interpretation,
each row of D sums to 1. To ensure the stability of the entire error process, the spatial
autocorrelation parameter, α , is restricted to lie within the interval [0,1). The errors, ε , are
independently and normally distributed. These assumptions are summarized in the following:
(a )

D [1] = [1]

( n× n )

( n× n )

( n× n )

(b) diag ( D ) = [0]

( n×n )

(3)

(c ) 0 ≤ α < 1
(d ) ε  N (0, σ 2 I )
In the SAR in error model, a α > 0 indicates a positive spatial dependence. This implies
that errors of same sign are geographically clustered together. On the other hand, a α < 0 implies
a negative spatial dependence, and this implies that the errors of the opposite sign are clustered
together geographically. When α = 0 , the SAR in errors model reduces to an OLS model. In a
retail context, similar consumer populations and shopping environments should exhibit a positive
spatial dependence among consumers. Individual stores should share similar retailing
environments with other stores in the same retail chain located nearby. This sharing should
present a positive spatial dependence among stores in a retail chain. Therefore, for convenience,
we use the restriction 0 ≤ α < 1. 12
2.3.2-2 Specification of the Spatial Weight Matrix
To model the spatial dependence among stores and consumers, we specify a spatial
weighting matrix D = wC + (1 − w) S , where C and S are weighting matrices for consumers and

This assumption is for convenience. If α < 0, the estimates should lie on the boundary
observe such a boundary solution.
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α = 0. We did not

stores respectively, and 0 ≤ w ≤ 1. When w = 1, D reduces to C. When w = 0, D reduces to S .
Empirically, we search the optimal w over [0.00, 0.01,…1.00].
We form C using the approach of nearest neighbors with geometrically decaying
weights. Under this scheme, the weight given to the block group depends on their proximity for
each block group relative to all other block groups and the rate of geometric decay.
Let dij represent the distance between the block groups of every pair of observations i
and j , and let d imth stand for the distance from the block group of observation i to its mth
nearest block group. Let wijc = 1 if 0 < d ≤ dimth and wijc = 0 otherwise. Let ρ represent 1 minus
ij

the rate of geometric decay of weights such that the h th closest neighbor of the block group of
observation i has a weight of ρ h where 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1. Then in a row-stochastic C ,
Cij = ρ h wijc

n

∑ρ

h

wijc and Cii = 0.

j =1
i≠ j

In our computation, we construct C by searching optimal m for 37 values over [0,1, 2…36] and
optimal ρ for 101 values over [0.00, 0.01…1.00].
We form S with the Delaunay triangulation approach. The Delaunay triangulation is the
geometric dual of the Voronoi diagram that is geometric expression of connections among
contiguous stores (Calciu and Salerno, 1997).13 Each store at a Delaunay triangle serves similar
consumer populations who tend to live together. With this approach, wijs = 1 when observations i
and j dot not belong to the same store and are at the same Delaunay triangle; wijs = 0 otherwise.
To have a row-stochastic S , we standardize each row so that

13

The Voronoi diagram has the property that for each store every point in the region around that store is closer to
that site than to any of the other stores.
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Sij = wijs

n

∑w

s
ij

and Sii = 0.

j =1
i≠ j

Because S is not sparse enough, a computer with 500 MB of RAM cannot do other
computations after constructing S physically.
To overcome the computer memory requirement, we recognize S before being
standardized is a multiplication of smaller matrixes. Specifically U = AGA′ when observations
are sorted by store, where U denote unstandardized S , G is a ns × ns weight matrix of
Delaunay triangulation for ns stores, A is a 0, 1 matrix whose dimension is n × ns . Aij = 1 when
observation i belongs to store j , and Aij = 0 otherwise. Let J be a n × 1 column vector whose
ith element equals the sum of U over columns for its ith row. Also let H stands for the n × ns

matrix whose ith row equals the ith row of AG divided by the ith element of J . Then S = HA′.
With this relationship, we can perform operations with S without physically constructing the
weighting matrix for stores and thus reduce required computer memory. As a result, in our actual
computation, D = wC + (1 − w) HA′ instead of D = wC + (1 − w) S .
Here is a numerical example showing how to express S with H and A. Assume we
have following matrixes for 4 retail sale observations for 3 stores:
1
1
A=
0

0

0
0
1
0

0
 0 1/ 2 1/ 2
0
and G = 1/ 2 0 1/ 2 .
0
1/ 2 1/ 2 0 

1

 0 1/ 2 1/ 2 
 0 1/ 2 1/ 2 
 . Then S can be expressed as:
In this example, H = 
1/ 3 0 1/ 3 


1/ 3 1/ 3 0 
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0 1/ 2 1/ 2 
 0 1/ 2 1/ 2 
 0
 0 1/ 2 1/ 2  1 1 0 0   0
0 1/ 2 1/ 2 
 0 0 1 0 = 
S = HA′ = 
 1/ 3 1/ 3 0 1/ 3  .
1/ 3 0 1/ 3  

 0 0 0 1  

1/ 3 1/ 3 0 
1/ 3 1/ 3 1/ 3 0 
2.3.2-3 Maximum Likelihood Computations
The SAR in error model in (2) and (3) has the following log-likelihood function,
L(α , β , σ 2 ) =

1
1
ln B −  n ln(2πσ 2 ) + σ −2 (Y − X β )′ B (Y − X β ) 
2
2

(4)

where B equals ( I − α D)′( I − α D). After being rearranged, the profile log-likelihood can be
written as
1
L(α , β , σ 2 ) ∝ ln I − α D − ln ( SSE (α )).
2

(5)

where SSE = (Y − X β )′B(Y − X β ) (Pace, Barry, Slawson, and Sirmans, 2002). We maximize
the log-likelihood by computing Equation (5) for 100 values of α over [0.00, 0.01,....0.99].
To overcome the computer memory requirement, we use Barry and Pace’s (2002) Matlab
function of Monte Carlo Log-determinant Estimator to compute estimates of ln I − α D ,
following Barry and Pace (1999). In particular, − ln I − α D can be expanded in a power series
as follows:
q

− ln I − α D = ∑
r =1

tr ( D r )α r
r

+

∞

∑

tr ( D r )α r

r = q +1

Using the above expansion together with &

r

.

x aZx tr Z
for any real n × n matrix Z and

x ax
n

x  N n ( 0, I ) , Barry and Pace (1999) show that ln I − α D can be approximated by V , the
expected value of Vi :
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x′i D r xi α r
Vi = − n∑
, i = 1, 2,... p,
r
r =1 x′i x i
q

where xi  N n ( 0, I ) , xi independent of x j if i ≠ j. Recognizing n p tr D r , they also show
the interval (V − F , V + F ) as the asymptotic 95% confidence interval for ln I − α D , where
s 2 (V1,V2 ,...V p )
nα q +1
+ 1.96
F=
. Empirically, we set p  30 and q  98 in computing
(q + 1)(1 − α )
p
V and use the lower bound of the 95% confidence interval for ln I − α D as conservative
estimates in maximizing the log-likelihood specified in Equation (5).
2.3.2-4 The Empirical Model
We rewrite the retail gravity models, Equation (1), in log form and empirically model
retail sales as:
ln( Salesbc ) = X β + υbc

(6)

where
X = [ X bc # X b # X c ] ,
X bc = [1, ln(distancebc ) ],
X b = a vector of variables pertaining to store b,
X c = a vector of variables pertaining to shoppers’ area c,
and υbc = a error term.
X b contains 5 variables of store characteristics. The 5 variables are
ln(lagged storesales), ln(centerage), ln( storesize) as well as two store-type dummies, strip
and pad . X c contains 9 variables in log form relevant to total potential expenditure and average
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travel time to work in log form for block group c. Specifically, the 10 variables are
ln(medicalsupp ), ln(medhsinc), ln(medhsval ), ln(houseage), ln(totpop ), ln(arealand ),
ln(medage), ln( popwhite), ln( females), and ln(l _ trvtim).
To model the spatial dependence among stores and consumers, we fit Equation (6) with a
SAR in error model using Pace and Barry’s (2002) spatial statistics toolbox 1.1. Specifically we
assume υbc  N (0,[(1 − α D)′(1 − α D)]−1 ).
The hypothesized signs for the variables in Equation (6) are summarized below.
(a) Positive signs (+): ln(lagged storesales ), ln( storesize), ln(medicalsupp ), ln(medhsinc),
ln(medhsval ), ln(totpop ), ln(arealand ), ln(medage), ln( popwhite), and ln( females).
(b) Negative signs (-): ln(distancebc ), ln(centerage), ln(houseage), ln(l _ trvtim), strip, and
pad .
2.4 Empirical Results
To understand the importance of the spatial dependencies, we calibrate four models that
consider different components of the spatial dependencies among consumers and stores. The first
model ignores the spatial dependence. The second model considers the spatial dependence
among stores. The third model considers the spatial dependence among consumers. The fourth
model considers both the spatial dependencies among stores and consumers. Table 2.2 presents
the calibration results of Equation (6).
The first model calibrates the gravity model with OLS. As hypothesized, the distance
variable has a significant coefficient of –0.818, with signed root deviance (SRD) –57.346. This
coefficient is the constant distance elasticity of retail sales, which measures the percentage
change in retail sales in respect of one percentage change in distance. In particular, the
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Table 2.2: Retail Gravity Models
Model 1
Independent variables
ln(distancebc )
ln(lagged storesales)
ln(centerage)
ln( storesize)
strip
pad
ln(medicalsupp )
ln(medhsinc)
ln(medhsval )
ln(houseage)
ln(totpop )
ln(arealand )
ln(medage)
ln( popwhite)
ln( females)
ln(l _ trvtim)
Intercept

β OLS
-0.818
-0.007
0.565
-1.059
-0.310
0.006
-0.030
-0.113
0.144
-0.358
-0.360
0.189
0.236
0.070
0.509
-0.683
12.700

Model 2
SRD
-57.346***
-0.154
9.638***
-9.378***
-8.947***
0.126
-0.495
-3.123***
3.581***
-7.201***
-2.586***
17.861***
2.425**
4.330***
3.910***
-11.122***
8.802***

w
α
m

Note:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

-0.815
0.054
0.514
-0.888
-0.305
-0.016
-0.029
-0.109
0.153
-0.346
-0.252
0.186
0.229
0.064
0.408
-0.683
13.683

SRD
-57.204***
0.761
7.529***
-5.355***
-8.888***
-0.258
-0.470
-3.015***
3.744***
-6.926***
-1.685*
17.476***
2.349**
3.902***
2.868***
-11.117***
6.016***

0
0.040
34
1
30
98
7,983
20
-36,165.081
0.386
0.384
8,608.654

ρ

p
q
n
k
Log likelihood
R2
adjR 2
SSE
Median e

β SAR

7,983
17
-36,165.975
0.386
0.385
8,610.588
0.712

1.337

0.715

w is the weight on the spatial weight matrix for consumers.
B is the spatial autoregression parameter.
m is the number of nearest blocks used in constructing the spatial weight matrix for consumers.

S represents 1 minus the rate of geometric decay of weights on neighboring blocks in the spatial weight matrix for consumers.
p is the number of trials performed to obtain the Monte Carlo estimates for the log-determinant term in the profile log-likelihood.
q is the highest order of power series expansion for the log-determinant term in the profile log-likelihood when obtaining the Monte

Carlo estimates.
SRD stands for signed root deviance that equals the square root of likelihood statistics with a sign of its coefficient.
* significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level
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(Table 2.2 continued)
Model 3
Independent variables
ln(distancebc )
ln(lagged storesales)
ln(centerage)
ln( storesize)
strip
pad
ln(medicalsupp )
ln(medhsinc)
ln(medhsval )
ln(houseage)
ln(totpop )
ln(arealand )
ln(medage)
ln( popwhite)
ln( females)
ln(l _ trvtim)
Intercept
w
α
m
ρ

p
q
n
k
Log likelihood
R2
adjR 2
SSE
Median e
Note:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

β SAR
-1.372
0.190
0.262
-0.557
-0.251
0.096
0.431
-0.038
0.186
-0.019
-0.170
0.031
0.010
0.078
0.163
-0.104
7.782
1
0.870
34
1
30
98
7,983
20
-35,264.586
0.540
0.539
6,448.063

Model 4
SRD
-68.304***
4.644***
4.958***
-5.290***
-8.424***
2.347**
6.049***
-0.895
4.101***
-0.292
-1.184
2.259**
0.098
3.282***
1.228
-1.332
5.296***

β SAR

SRD

-1.377
0.300
-0.079
0.490
-0.148
-0.112
0.386
-0.001
0.198
-0.051
0.003
0.049
0.034
0.064
0.044
-0.077
2.518

-69.721***
7.012***
-1.394
4.021***
-5.065***
-2.736***
5.537***
-0.024
4.398***
-0.839
0.021
3.390***
0.352
2.755***
0.333
-0.997
1.573

0.840
42.409***
0.990
34
1
30
98
7,983
21
-35,163.504
0.548
0.547
6,331.684

0.607

44.777***

0.596

w is the weight on the spatial weight matrix for consumers.
B is the spatial autoregression parameter.
m is the number of nearest blocks used in constructing the spatial weight matrix for consumers.

S represents 1 minus the rate of geometric decay of weights on neighboring blocks in the spatial weight matrix for consumers.
p is the number of trials performed to obtain the Monte Carlo estimates for the log-determinant term in the profile log-likelihood.
q is the highest order of power series expansion for the log-determinant term in the profile log-likelihood when obtaining the Monte

Carlo estimates.
SRD stands for signed root deviance that equals the square root of likelihood statistics with a sign of its coefficient.
* significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level
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coefficient here predicts a 0.818% decrease in a store’s sales in a block group when the distance
between the store and the block group increases 1%.
The dummy for a strip shopping center has a significant and negative coefficient, as
hypothesized. This coefficient is consistent with Sirmans and Guidry (1993) and Oppewal and
Timmermans (1999, cited in Mejia and Benjamin, 2002). A mall has more aesthetically
appealing design and usually provides more protection from stormy weather to shoppers than
other types of shopping centers do (Sirmans and Guildry, 1993). Oppewal and Timmermans
(1999, cited in Mejia and Benjamin, 2002) find that design influences consumer perception of
shopping centers and, thus affects retail sales. However, several other variables have significant
coefficients with signs opposite to those hypothesized by retail gravity. For variables pertaining
to consumers, median household income and total population of a block group have significant
and negative coefficients. Their signs are inconsistent with our hypotheses. For variables
pertaining to retail stores, store size and shopping center age have significant coefficients with
signs inconsistent with our hypotheses. Shopping center age has a positive coefficient while
hypothesized to have a negative coefficient. In addition, store size has a negative coefficient
while hypothesized to have a positive coefficient.
The second model models only the spatial dependence among stores. The distance
variable decreases slightly the magnitude of its coefficient by only 0.37% in absolute value. The
coefficient changes from –0.818 to –0.8165and remains significant with SRD –57.204. Although
lagged store sales changes its coefficient from negative to hypothesized positive, the coefficient
is insignificant. The dummy for a pad shopping center changes to have a hypothesized negative
coefficient but remains insignificant. Store size still has a significant and negative coefficient.
However, its SRD decreases near 43% in absolute value from –9.378 to –5.355. The spatial
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dependence among stores does not change either the signs or the significances of the coefficients
of variables pertaining to consumers. Nevertheless, the singed root deviances for median
household income and total population of a block group decrease 3.46% and 34.84% in absolute
value respectively.
The third model calibrates only the spatial dependence among consumers into the gravity
model. The distance variable dramatically increases the magnitude of its coefficient by 68.34%
in absolute value to –1.372 compared to –0.815 in the second model. The SRD for the distance
variable also considerably increases more than 19% in absolute value from –57.204 to –68.304.
In addition, this spatial dependence has a great influence on variables pertaining to consumers.
The coefficients of median household income and total population of a block group become
insignificant, but still have signs opposite to our hypotheses. As a result, now there are no
consumer variables having significant coefficients with signs opposite to our hypotheses. Median
house age, median age of consumers, female population, and average travel time to work change
to have insignificant coefficients. Nevertheless, median medical supplies expenditure changes to
have a positive and significant coefficient as hypothesized.
The spatial dependence among consumers also has influences on store variables. Lagged
store sales, a proxy for store management, changes its coefficient from insignificant to
significant positive, as hypothesized. This coefficient is consistent with Black’s (1966; cited in
Eilon, Tilley and Fowkes, 1969) argument. More sales enable a store to carry a greater variety of
products, improve its services to customers, and compete with other stores. In addition, lagged
store sales may pick up the effect of store age on better management or other unobservables.
Start-up problems may adversely affect sales for stores in new locations (Hise, Kelly, Gable, and
McDonald, 1983). Stores in business longer should have overcome the start-up problems and
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have larger store sales. All these effects can increase the attractive power of a store. Store size
still has a significant and negative coefficient. Nonetheless, its magnitude decreases 37.27% in
absolute value from –0.888 to –0.557, and its SRD decreases 1.21% in absolute value from –
5.355 to –5.290. However, the dummy for a pad shopping center changes to have a significant
and positive coefficient. This coefficient is not consistent with Sirmans and Guidry (1993) and
Oppewal and Timmermans (1999, cited in Mejia and Benjamin, 2002).
The fourth model models both the spatial dependencies among stores and consumers.
Compared to the third model, the coefficient for distance slightly increases another 0.36% in its
absolute magnitude from –1.372 to –1.377. The SRD for the distance variable increases another
2.07% in absolute value from –68.304 to –69.721. The other most important variable, store size,
in the retail gravity model now have a significant coefficient with hypothesized sign. Its
coefficient changes to significant and positive in Model 4 from significant and negative in
Models 1, 2, and 3. The coefficient changes from –0.557 in Model 3 to 0.490 in Model 4. The
change is a near 188% increase in magnitude. The SRD for store size changes from –5.290 to
4.021. The dummy for a pad shopping center changes to have a significant and negative
coefficient, as hypothesized. In addition, center age changes to have a negative coefficient.
Although the coefficient is not significant, it has a hypothesized sign. This sign agrees with
Sirmans and Guidry’s (1993) and Gatzlaff, Sirmans, and Diskin’s (1994) arguments. They argue
that older shopping centers generally suffer functional or physical deficiencies and have an
inappropriate tenant mix due to changing markets, and thus have less attractive power. The
coefficient for lagged store sales increases about 58% in magnitude from 0.190 to 0.300. Its SRD
also increase considerably from 4.644 to 7.012. This change constitutes near 51% in magnitude.
The coefficients of total population of a block group become positive, as hypothesized, but
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remain insignificant. Median household income still has an insignificant and negative
coefficient. Nevertheless, the coefficient decreases more than 97% in absolute value from –0.038
to -0.001. The SRD for the median household income also decreases more than 97% in absolute
value from –0.895 to –0.024.
Besides the coefficients, model selection criteria also show models perform better when
incorporating both the spatial dependencies than otherwise. Adjusted R-squared increases from
0.385 for the first model to 0.547 for the fourth model. The fourth model displays considerably
lower error than the first model. In fact the SSE from the first model of 8,610.588 is 35.99%
higher than the SSE from the fourth model of 6,331.684. Median absolute errors decrease
16.29% from 0.712 for the first model to 0.596 for the fourth model. The log-likelihoods also
show the fourth model outperforms the other three models. In fact, the likelihood ratio statistics
between Model 1 and Model 4 is about 2,005 that is very highly significant.
2.5 Conclusions

Gravity-type models have been applied to the retail context extensively. Guitschi (1981)
and Eppli and Shilling (1996) suggested that the distance parameter for retail gravity models may
be significantly overstated in the existing studies. Using actual sales for a retail chain in the
Houston market and modeling spatial dependence among customers and stores, we find that
previous retail gravity research may have understated the magnitude of the distance parameter by
as much as 68%. This result implies previous studies may overestimate the deterministic extent
of trade areas reflected in the distance parameter and understate the importance of good
locations.
Unlike previous studies, we incorporate both the spatial dependencies among stores and
consumers in a retail gravity model, using a SAR in error model. Our results show ignoring the
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spatial dependence among consumers underestimates the distance parameter more than 68%.
This percentage indicates the spatial dependence among consumers is far more important than
the spatial dependence among stores in terms of estimating the parameter of the retailer distance
to consumers.
Besides the spatial dependence among consumers, we also incorporate the spatial
dependence among stores. Our results show the spatial dependence among store needs to be
incorporated into empirical retail gravity studies, along with the spatial dependence among
consumers. The results are consistent with the retail literature documenting the importance of
comparison-shopping and multi-purpose shopping behaviors of consumers. Our result also
implies existing studies have failed to recognize the random component of trade areas reflected
on the spatial autocorrelation parameter and the spatial weight matrix in a SAR in errors model.
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CHAPTER 3
LOCAL HOUSING PRICES AND MORTGAGE REFINANCING
IN U.S. CITIES
3.1 Introduction
The U.S. has experienced three booms of refinancing activity in the past fifteen years.1 Such
refinancing activity affects mortgage bankers, investors, and regulators. Clearly, these refinancing
waves challenge mortgage bankers, since refinancing constitutes a substantial portion of their
business. Refinancing booms influence their decisions in allocating their human and technological
assets. Mortgage servicers lose business once a mortgage they currently serve is refinanced, and
hence unexpected refinancing reduces profits. Naturally, this refinancing risk affects the lending
institution that sells and holds mortgages. And as a result, a regulator who desires to develop
measures of capital adequacy among these institutions should also consider the effects of
refinancing upon regulated firms. Mortgage investors are also concerned with refinancing.
Refinancing terminates mortgages, or the mortgages underlying mortgage-backed securities
(MBS). Thus, proper valuation of mortgages as well as MBS hinges on the ability to model
refinancing and other types of mortgage termination risk.
Recent option-based mortgage and MBS valuation models have recognized that house prices
are another important determinant of mortgage termination in addition to interest rates (e.g.,
Hillard, Kau, and Slawson (1998)). Most existing models, however, consider the direct impact of
house price change on default behavior (Downing Stanton and Wallce, 2001; DSW hereafter).2 In
other words, a derease in house prices first increases the likelihood of default. The likelihood of

1 The three refinancing booms occured in 1986-87, 1992-93, and 1998-1999.
2

One exception is Mattey and Wallace (2001) who provide evidence that house price declines directly impact
mortgage termination through collateral constraints.
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default in turn decreases the possibility of prepayment. Nevertheless the two factors result in an
increase in total terminations (DSW, 2001). DSW (2001) argue that the effect of a drop in house
prices could lead to a significant decrease in total terminations, if house prices have a first order
effect not only on default but also on refinancing or mobility related mortgage prepayment. Since
refinancing is the dominant component of prepayments, we examine the influence of house price
change on mortgage refinancing.3
Many studies model refinancing risk separately or together with other termination risks. Some
of these studies have examined the relation between housing prices and prepayment decisions of
individual borrowers. Examples of such studies are Cunningham and Capone (1990), Dickinson
and Heuson (1993), Peristiani, Bennett, Monsen, Peach and Raiff (1997 a and b; PBMPR
hereafter), Caplin, Freeman, and Tracy (1997), as well as Bennett, Peach, and Peristiani (2001;
BPP hereafter). Except Dickinson and Heuson (1993), the studies provide evidence only on the
collateral constraint brought by house price changes. On the other hand, Dickinson and Heuson
(1993) have evidence that borrowers react to the relaxation of the house value constraint brought
on by appreciation to the fullest extent possible given their income.
A few studies investigate the relation between housing price changes and aggregate
refinancing activities that are of concern to the valuation of MBS. Two such studies are Mattey and
Wallace (1998), and Bennett, Keane and Mosser (1999; BKM hereafter). Mattey and Wallace
(1998) focus on the collateral constraint effect and provide evidence that a decrease in local
housing prices significantly decreases county-level aggregate refinancing activities. Furthermore,
they confine their study to California where housing prices declined in their study period from

3 Patruno (1994) argue that refinancing is the dominant risk in prepayment risk. Mattey and Wallace (1998) provide
evidence that the refinancing channel appears to be the strongest channels for housing prices to affect mortgage
terminations.
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1992 to 1996. In fact, they call for research to investigate the robustness of their finding. BKM
(1999), on the other hand, investigate the relation with the seasonally adjusted Mortgage Bankers
Association Refinance Index and find no significant relation between housing prices and aggregate
refinancing activities at the national level for the period from 1990 to 1998.
In this paper, we provide evidence that local housing prices have a significant effect on
aggregate refinancing activities. We examine MSA or PMSA refinancing activities from 1990 to
2000. Furthermore, we extend the previous studies by providing evidence that positive housing
price appreciation promotes cash-out refinancing and negative housing price depreciation
discourages cash-out refinancing in addition to the collateral constraint effect suggested by Mattey
and Wallace (1998) and other previous studies. The evidence is consistent with the ideas that
positive house value appreciation provides a motivation for refinancing to change the borrower’s
capital structure or to fund his consumption, and house value depreciation discourages the
borrower to do cash-out refinance. Our evidence supports DSW’s (2001) idea that option-based
MBS pricing models should be amended to accommodate the direct impact of house prices on
refinancing in addition to default behavior.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: section 3.2 discuss a borrower’s incentives and
abilities to refinance; section 3.3 discusses the relation between local housing prices and aggregate
refinancing activity; section 3.4 describes the data sources and empirical methodology; section 3.5
section presents the empirical results; and section 3.6 concludes with the key results.
3.2 Incentives and Abilities to Refinance
The observed refinancing behavior reflects an individual mortgage borrower’s incentives and
ability to refinance. The incentive emphasized most in the literature is to exercise the call option
imbedded in the standard residential mortgage contracts. In either a fixed-rate mortgage (FRM) or
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an adjustable rate mortgage (ARM), the mortgage borrower can be viewed as the seller of a
callable mortgage bond to the lender. The borrower can call the mortgage bond at any time prior to
its maturity, similar to American-type call options. In theory, a borrower will only exercise the
option when it is “in the money”.
A common approach measuring whether the refinancing option in a FRM is “in the money”
focuses on the difference between the present value of the reductions in monthly interest payments
in the future ( PV ( PMTe ) − PV ( PMTn ) ) and the present value of the transaction costs of
refinancing ( TC ) (Follain and Tzang, 1988). PV ( PMTe ) equals the present value of the payments
at the existing mortgage rate, and PV ( PMTn ) equals the present value of the payment discounted
at the new mortgage rate. The transaction costs include legal fees and other origination fees for a
new loan. Algebraically the option is in the money if PV ( PMTe ) − PV ( PMTn ) > TC. The present
value of the reductions in interest payments depends on the borrower’s expected holding period of
the mortgage and the interest spread between the prevailing market mortgage rate for the new loan
and the contract rate of the existing loan. Therefore, the larger is the interest spread between the
prevailing mortgage rate and the contract rate on the existing loan, the more likely will the
borrower refinance. In addition, the shorter is his expected holding period, the less likely will the
mortgagor refinance.
Follain, Scott and Yang (1992) reach a similar conclusion. They focus on information
asymmetry between the mortgage borrower and the lender. The information asymmetry exists
because the borrower knows more about his expected holding period than the lender. When
initiating a mortgage, the borrower values the mortgage based on his expected holding period; on
the other hand, the lender assigns a value that depends on an estimate of the average holding period
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of all borrowers. As a result, a borrower with a below market average holding period will value the
call option imbedded in the new loan less than the lender does; on the other hand, a borrower with
an above market average holding period will value the option more than the lender does. As such,
a borrower with a shorter expected holding period finds refinancing more expensive and thus is
less likely to refinance than a borrower with a longer expected holding period. In general, more
mobile is a borrower, a shorter period will he expect to hold the mortgage. Thus, a borrower’s
mobility is likely to inversely relate with his likelihood to refinance.
The holder of an “in-the-money” American option often waits rather than exercise
immediately (Hull, 2000). The option is said to have time value. Like an American option, the
refinancing option often has time value because future mortgage rates are uncertain. Because the
future path of mortgage rats is not known with certainty, there is a potential benefit from
postponing refinancing until rates fall still further (Chen and Ling, 1989). Immediate exercise of
the refinancing option results in the loss in value from a possible future exercise of the option. The
time value of the refinancing option has implications on observed refinancing phenomena. The
higher is the expected value or the volatility of future mortgage rates, the less likely is the mortgage
borrower to refinance immediately when the refinancing option is in the money (Dickinson and
Heuson, 1993). Gilberto and Thibodeau (1989) have supporting evidence for this relation.
A pure floating ARM would seldom be “in the money” because contract rates would closely
track market rates (Ambrose and LaCour-Little, 2001). However, an actual ARM contract is not a
pure floating rate instrument because of interest rate caps and teasers. A typical ARM has two
types of interest rate caps. Periodic caps limit the change in the contract interest rate to a
pre-specified percentage points above or below the prior period’s contract rate and the lifetime cap
establish a maximum and minimum contract rate within a pre-specified percentage points of the
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initial contract rate. When interest rates decline so that caps restrict the borrower’s access to lower
market rates, the refinancing option in an ARM becomes “in the money” (Cunningham and
Capone, 1990). Because interest rates are reset periodically, an ARM borrower is less sensitive to
both historical and expected interest rate changes than a FRM borrower in terms of refinancing his
mortgage (Cunningham and Capone, 1990). Nevertheless, a borrower with expected holding
period below the market average is likely to self-select an ARM contract (Yang and Maris, 1993).
The shorter holding period offsets the benefit of refinancing from a lower interest rate. In fact,
Brueckner (1992) argue that ARM borrowers as a group are unlikely to refinance for financial
reasons given their relatively short holding periods. However, the refinancing option embedded in
the existing loan may become in the money because a teaser offered by a new ARM loan. By
self-selection, a teased ARM borrower may refinance faster than a non-teased ARM borrower.
Evidence regarding this assumption is mixing. Green and Shilling (1997) show that teased ARMs
are not prepaid faster; however, Ambrose and LaCour-Little (2001) find they are prepaid faster
than non-teased ARMs. Ambrose and LaCour-Little (2001) suggest difference of regionally related
transaction costs in the two studies’ samples may explain their difference in results.4
Most existing studies implicitly assume the refinancing borrower replaces his/her existing
loan with a new loan of the same type. For instance, a FRM borrower refinances with a new FRM,
and an ARM borrower refinances with a new ARM contract. However, the mortgage borrower is
not confined to refinance with a same type of loan. Therefore, the intrinsic value of the refinancing
option depends on only the interest rates for mortgages of the same type but also the rates for
mortgages of the other type. Specifically an ARM borrower with a lower current mortgage rate
may be motivated to refinance with a FRM with a higher current mortgage rate when he expects
4 Specifically mortgage recording taxes in New York and Florida may effectively increase the transaction costs of
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mortgage rates have reached a trough (McConnell and Singh, 1994; cited in LaCour-Little, 2001).
Conversely, a FRM borrower may be motivated to refinance with an ARM when he plans to sell
the house in the near future (QuickenLoans.com, 2002).
In addition to the incentive to exercise the refinancing option, a mortgage borrower may
have incentives to do a cash-out refinance to adjust his housing consumption or to alter his existing
capital structure. Fungibility is the key concept underlying the cash-out refinancing incentives
here. Drawing on the equity in the borrower’s property to get cash is fungible from the standpoint
of the borrower’s overall investment and consumption decision. Since money carries no labels and
a mortgage loan usually costs less than other loans (especially after-tax), the borrower can
refinance his mortgage to adjust the composition of his personal financial portfolio by taking
equity out of his home to pay off debts, invest in other assets, or finance consumption.5, 6
Refinancing motivated by housing consumption adjustments is driven by a borrower’s
demographic or socioeconomic characteristics that influence his demand for housing (Gilberto and
Thibodeau, 1989). Supporting the assumption, Gilberto and Thibodeau (1989) provide empirical
evidence showing that refinancing rates increase with increases in household income and
household size, and vary by age of household head. Mortgage.com companies have heavily
advertised the advantages of cash-out refinancing to consolidate other debts, in particular credit
card debt. Examining the major components of household debt over the period from 1986 to 1992,

prepayment and, thus slow the prepayment speed.
5 According to Canner, Luckett and Dukin (1990), a consumer survey sponsored by the Federal Reserve Board during
mid-1989 showed that nearly 60 percent of those who refinance also borrow additional funds. Follain, Lekkas and
Lehman (1999) document that more than half of all mortgage-swapping deals involved a cash-out refinance in 1998.
BPP (2001) find over 43% of refinancers in their study take equity out of their properties.
6 Specifically an individual is allowed to take out up to $100,000 from his or her principal residence in addition to the
original debt used to buy the home, and deduct the interest charged before it is repaid (see IRS Publication 936, Home
Mortgage Interest Deduction).
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Eugeni (1993) have evidence suggesting that consumers have been substituting home equity
borrowing for other types of debt.
Just because a mortgage borrower has incentives to refinance, it does not mean that he/she will
be able to refinance. There is one important hurdle for the borrower to cross: he/she must be able to
qualify for a new mortgage loan. In addition to evaluating the borrower’s credit report and the title,
the lender generally uses FNMA/FHLMC guidelines to evaluate a borrower’s risk in his
underwriting process.7 The lender is likely to reject the borrower if he/she is considered too risky
according to the guidelines.
We briefly describe the guidelines here (see Floyd and Allen (1999) for more detail). The
guidelines fall into three categories: loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, income ratios, and down payment
sources. The LTV ratio is determined by dividing the requested loan amount by the value of the
applicant’s property at time of requesting the loan. As a general guideline, a loan application with
an LTV ratio below 80 percent is routinely accepted. An application with the ratio above 80
percent will generally be asked to reduce the ratio to 80 percent or to apply for mortgage insurance.
Two income ratios are considered: the mortgage debt ratio (MDR) and the total debt ratio (TDR).
The MDR is defined as the percentage of a borrower’s gross monthly income required to meet
monthly housing expenses. As a guideline for conventional loans, the MDR must not exceed 28
percent.8 The TDR is defined as the percentage of a borrower’s gross monthly income required to
meet monthly contractual expenses. In general, the TDR must not exceed 36 percent for
conventional loans. The third category of guideline refers to sources for the borrower’s down

7 Peristiani, Bennett, Monsen, Peach and Raiff (1997a and b) have empirical evidence showing that a borrower’s
personal creditworthiness affects his refinancing possibility.
8 Conventional loans are those that not insured by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), guaranteed by the
Veterans Administration (VA), or insured by Farmer Home Administration (FmHA).
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payment for a home purchase. In general, funds for the down payment should be provided by the
borrower rather than outside sources.
The lending environment may also affect a borrower’s incentives and ability to refinance
(PBMPR, 1997 a and b; BKM, 1999, BPP, 2001). Structural changes on both the supply side and
the demand side of the mortgage market have reduced transaction costs and frictions associated
with obtaining a mortgage loan (BPP, 2001). The lending industry has become much more
competitive and aggressive in regards to soliciting refinancing. Mortgage lenders have begun to
contact potential borrowers to encourage them to refinance. Information process technology has
shortened the period from application to approval and then from approval to closing. The increased
competition in the primary mortgage market together with information process technology has
lowered both financial and nonfinancial transaction costs to refinance. Having experienced
successive waves of intensive refinancing activity, mortgagors have increased the general level of
awareness of the potential benefits of refinancing and have a propensity to refinance with a smaller
interest rate spread than before (BPP, 2001).
3.3 Local Housing Prices and Aggregate Refinancing Activities
Aggregate refinancing activities are outcomes of individual refinancing behavior. Local
housing prices are the aggregate representations of individual house prices in local markets.
Therefore, local housing prices may be related to aggregate refinancing activities because
individual house prices influence individual homeowners’ incentives and abilities to refinance
his/her adjustable-rate or fixed-rate mortgage.
As discussed in Section 3.2, an application for a new loan with the LTV ratio below 80% is
more likely, or less expensive, to be approved. The LTV ratio guideline is designed to protect the
lender from default risk: the higher the LTV ratio, the less equity has the borrower on his house. A
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borrower who has a little equity is more likely to default, if the value of the property should fall
below the loan amount. In a refinancing case, the LTV ratio is defined as the requested new loan
amount divided by the borrower’s house price at time of requesting the loan. Given a fixed loan
amount, the higher a house is priced, the more likely the LTV ratio is below 80%. The borrower is
therefore more likely to qualify for refinancing. Aggregate house prices and the LTV ratios across
individuals. The higher is a current local housing price, the more proportion of individual
borrowers is likely to have the LTV ratios below 80 percent. Thus we expect current local housing
prices to be positively related with aggregate refinancing rates.
Home equity not only provides protection for the lender, but also provides the ability for the
borrower to borrow additional funds to adjust his/her housing consumption, or to alter his/her
existing capital structure, when refinancing his/her mortgage. Home equity changes over time after
the origination of a loan. The borrower actually builds up his/her equity when he makes his/her
monthly mortgage payments in an amortizing loan.9 Each monthly payment consists of an interest
portion and a principal portion. The principal portion is the amount of equity built by the borrower
in each payment. Home equity also changes when the borrower’s house price changes. Home
equity is the value of the house price minus the unpaid mortgage balance. Therefore, house
appreciation increases home equity, and house depreciation decreases home equity. Thus, changes
in the house price positively affect the likelihood of the borrower to apply a cash-out refinance.
Nevertheless, changes of a borrower’s house price may not have a symmetric influence in
magnitude. House price appreciation may have a weaker influence on the likelihood of a borrower
to refinance than house price depreciation because home equity increases over time whenever the
borrower makes monthly mortgage payments. When enough time passes, the built-up home equity
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alone can provide enough benefit for the borrower to refinance in order to borrow additional funds.
In other words, the borrower would still do cash-out refinancing even if his house price does not
change. On the other hand, house price depreciation would erode the built-up equity and
discourage the borrower to refinance at the moment when monthly payments build just enough
equity.
Furthermore, house price appreciation and depreciation may interact with mortgage rate
movements. The borrower is much more likely to cash out the untapped equity brought on by
house appreciation when his existing mortgage carries an above-market interest rate than when the
existing mortgage carries a below-market rate. We have this proposition because the borrower is
likely to apply a subordinate mortgage to cash out his home equity when his existing mortgage
carries a below-market interest rate. On the other, house price depreciation may be more easily to
discourage the borrower to do a cash-out refinance when his existing loan carries a below-market
mortgage rate than when carries an above-market rate. We expect the borrower to have this
behavior because the borrower has to give up a loan with a positive net present value when his loan
carries a below-market rate. Thus, the opportunity cost per dollar of the additional borrowed funds
is larger when the existing loan carries a below-market interest rate than when the loan carries an
above-market rate.
Reflecting at the aggregate level, positive changes of local housing prices are expected to
increase cash-out refinances, and negative changes of local housing prices are expected to decrease
refinances. In additional, positive changes of local housing prices are expected to have greater
influences on refinancing when interest rates have declined than when rates have increased or
unchanged. On the other hand, negative changes of local housing prices are expected to have
9 Amortizing loans are the dominant loan type in the US housing industry after 1930 because of the promotion of the
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greater influence on refinancing when mortgage rates have increased or unchanged compared with
when mortgage rates have declined.
3.4 Data Sources and Methodology
This section consists of two parts. Part 1 discusses the data employed and describes refinance
rates over U.S. cities from 1990 to 2000. Part 2 presents the empirical methodology used to
investigate the relations between local housing prices and refinance rates discussed in Section 3.3.
3.4.1 Data Sources
To examine the relationship between local housing prices and aggregate refinancing
activities from the period of 1990 to 2000, we collected data from five sources. The sources are the
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) Aggregate Reports, the American Housing Survey
(AHS) for selected metropolitan areas, Monthly Interest Rate Survey (MIRS) of the Federal
Housing Finance Board and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, the Office of Federal Housing
Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) house price index, and the 1990 census. From these sources, we
obtained relevant data for 14 Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) or Primary Metropolitan
Statistical Areas (PMSAs).10 In total we obtained 154 observations.
The HMDA Aggregate Reports provide total numbers of originated refinancing loans for
1-to-4 family dwellings for the 14 metropolitan areas each year. 11, 12 We estimate mortgage

Federal Housing Administration (Floyd and Allen, 1999).
10 The 14 metropolitan areas are Atlanta, GA, Chicago, IL, Columbus, OH, Denver, CO, Detroit, MI, Houston, TX,
Indianapolis, IN, Kansas City, MO-KS, Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI, Philadelphia, PA-NJ, Pittsburgh, PA,
Rochester, NY, St. Louis, MO-IL, and San Diego, CA.
11 The Federal Institutions Examinations Council (FFIEC) produces the HMDA Aggregate Reports using information
provided on the loan/application registers. In general, a depository lender that has assets above a certain level and has
a home or branch office or a nondepository lender that has lending activity in a MSA or PMSA has to maintain a
loan/application register to enter data about each application received and each loan originated or purchased. See “A
Guide to HMDA Reporting: Getting it Right” (Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, 1998) for more
details.
12 The refinanced loans can be conventional, FHA-insured, VA-guaranteed, or FmHA-insured loans for home
purchases or home improvements. The refinanced loans can be either adjustable-rate or fixed-rate loans.
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inventories for 1-to-4 family residential properties for the 14 metropolitan areas from the AHS.
The AHS provides owner-occupied numbers with mortgages only for 1-unit structures. The survey
also provides owner-occupied numbers of 1-unit detached structures, 1-unit attached structures,
and 2-to-4 unit structures. To estimate mortgage inventories for 1-to-4 family properties, we
assume the proportion of 2-to-4 unit structures with mortgages is the same to the proportion of
1-unit structures with mortgages. The AHS is conducted 5 times for the period from 1984 to 2004:
1984-1987, 1988-1991, 1992-1994, 1995-1998, and 1999-2004. Not every metropolitan area is
surveyed each time. The estimated numbers of the mortgage inventories from the conducted
surveys are cubic splined to estimate the annual numbers.
Table 3.1 presents the refinancing rates computed with the estimated mortgage inventories
and the numbers of refinancing loans from the HMDA Aggregate Reports for the 14 metropolitan
areas from 1990 through 2000. The computed refinancing rates clearly pick up the 1992-1993 and
1998-1999 refinancing booms. As shown in Table 3.1, there are substantial variations in
refinancing rates not only over the period 1990 to 2000 at each metropolitan area, but also among
the 14 metropolitan areas each year, in particular 1992-1993 and 1998-1999. The two peaks and
variations of refinancing activity also clearly stand out in Figure 3.1.
We use the OFHEO quarterly repeat sales house price index for the housing price time
series over the 14 metropolitan areas. The OFHEO estimates the index for single-family residential
properties using the data on conventional conforming mortgage transactions obtained from the
Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. To obtain the dollar values of local housing prices every year, we
first take the four-quarter average for each year then multiply the annual numbers with the median
owner-occupied house values for the metropolitan areas from the 1990 Census. As shown in
Figure 3.2, there are substantial variations among local housing prices each year and over time.
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Table 3.1: Refinance Rates for the 14 Metropolitan Areas
Refinance
Rates

Atlanta, GA

Chicago, IL

Columbus, OH

Denver, CO

Detroit, MI

Houston, TX

Indianapolis, IN

Kansas City,
MO-KS

1990

1.25%

1.39%

1.42%

0.76%

1.92%

0.59%

2.01%

1.34%

1991

3.29%

3.90%

4.09%

2.75%

5.43%

1.20%

4.18%

2.90%

1992

9.75%

10.77%

12.16%

8.83%

15.08%

5.36%

11.67%

8.92%

1993

17.80%

15.42%

16.51%

21.96%

20.95%

10.73%

15.42%

15.43%

1994

5.94%

6.90%

6.17%

7.25%

6.69%

4.15%

6.57%

5.79%

1995

4.13%

4.84%

4.09%

5.13%

6.04%

1.52%

4.61%

3.88%

1996

6.58%

8.06%

8.90%

10.34%

9.70%

2.75%

9.63%

7.35%

1997

7.23%

9.17%

8.38%

11.27%

11.63%

1.94%

9.48%

8.41%

1998

17.91%

21.53%

17.65%

28.74%

27.96%

8.32%

19.16%

18.54%

1999

10.83%

13.37%

11.12%

16.45%

17.10%

6.09%

11.05%

12.48%

2000
Standard
Deviation

6.20%

7.65%

5.76%

9.46%

10.92%

3.35%

6.05%

7.40%

5.45%

5.72%

5.19%

8.33%

7.65%

3.19%

5.12%

5.28%

Philadelphia,
PA-NJ

Pittsburgh, PA

(Table 3.1 continued)
Refinance
Minneapolis
Rates -St. Paul, MN-WI

Rochester, NY St. Louis, MO-IL

San Diego, CA Standard deviation

1990

1.36%

0.89%

0.75%

1.88%

2.69%

5.62%

1.27%

1991

4.49%

2.06%

1.72%

2.76%

4.86%

9.74%

2.10%

1992

12.17%

6.78%

6.36%

7.73%

14.99%

21.55%

4.29%

1993

25.35%

10.62%

9.38%

12.37%

21.47%

29.08%

5.83%

1994

6.50%

4.15%

4.81%

4.48%

7.83%

11.32%

1.85%

1995

3.54%

2.30%

3.37%

2.42%

5.17%

6.46%

1.41%

1996

9.29%

3.83%

6.17%

4.62%

8.38%

8.29%

2.34%

1997

7.93%

3.91%

6.44%

4.42%

9.68%

9.71%

2.81%

1998

21.89%

8.82%

13.00%

12.56%

22.49%

27.42%

6.63%

1999

11.78%

6.54%

9.84%

8.00%

13.17%

17.30%

3.57%

2000
Standard
Deviation

7.31%

3.71%

6.57%

3.76%

7.83%

8.87%

2.21%

7.45%

2.99%

3.60%

3.78%

6.57%

8.40%

6.27%
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Figure 3.1 Local Refinance Rates
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The MIRS is conducted by the Federal Housing Finance Board since 1989 and was
conducted by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board on a sample of major mortgage lenders that
includes savings and loan associations, savings banks, commercial banks, and mortgage
companies. Such lenders have accounted for more than 90 percent of all conventional home
mortgage loan originations. We use the annual contract interest rates of the MIRS to trace the
mortgage rate movements for the 14 metropolitan areas. The MIRS provides annual historical
contract interest rates on single-family conventional loans for selected metropolitan areas dated
back to 1978. The contract rates are averages, weighted by lenders’ mortgage holdings, of the
initial interest rates reported on the mortgages for both adjustable-rate and fixed-rate loans. As
shown in Figure 3.3, local mortgage interests are very close and move very closely over time. The
pattern suggests that interest rate variation is unlikely to be the only force causing the variation of
refinancing activity among the metropolitan areas.
3.4.2 Methodology
Obtaining the data above, we operationalize the conceptual relations between local housing
prices and aggregate mortgage refinancing activities. As discussed earlier, current local housing
prices may affect refinancing due to the collateral constraint effect, and housing price changes may
influence cash-out refinancing due to home equity changes. Housing price changes may have an
asymmetric influence in magnitude due to house equity built up by monthly mortgage payments.
Furthermore, housing price depreciation and housing price appreciation may interact with interest
rate movements. In particular, housing price depreciation affects refinancing more when interest
rates have increased or unchanged than when interest rates have declined, due to different
opportunity costs of giving up existing loans. On the other hand, housing price appreciation affects
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refinancing more when interest rates have declined, because a borrower may apply a subordinate
mortgage when interest rates have increased or unchanged.
To allow the possibilities of asymmetric influence, we calibrate the relations empirically with
Equation (1).13
ln(refinancing loans ) = β1 + β 2 (conditional housing price depreciation)
+ β3 (housing price depreciation)
+ β 4 (conditional housing price appreciation)
+ β5 (housing price appreciation)

(1)

+ β 6 ln(current housing prices ) + β 7 ln(mortgaged households)
+ β8−17 ( year dummies) + β18−30 (city dummies ) + ε
Where refinancing loans means the number of refinancing loans for 1-to-4 family
dwellings, mortgaged households means the number of 1-to-4 family dwellings with outstanding
mortgages, house price depreciation is the absolute value of negative housing price changes,
housing price appreciation is positive housing price changes, conditional housing price
deprecation is defined as housing price depreciation conditional on interest rates having increased
or unchanged and, conditional housing price appreciation is defined as housing price appreciation
conditional on interest rate having declined. 14,15
The 10 individual year dummies are used to capture interest rate movements and the
lending environment. The 13 city dummies are used to proxy for household characteristics and

13 RESET tests and R-squared suggest the double-log model instead of linear or semi-log models.
14

Housing price changes are cumulative changes of median housing prices over past five years. We choose five years
as the interval for measuring housing price changes because of two reasons. First, recent three refinancing booms occur
every five years. This pattern suggests that five years probably is the holding period of a mortgage for most borrowers.
Second, we collect the median origination years of primary mortgages from various volumes of AHS since 1984. Then
we calculate the average holding periods form the median origination years for the 14 metropolitan areas. The average
holding period is 4.63 years. This also suggests that five years probably is the holding period of a mortgage for most
borrowers.
15 We implement the calibration of Equation (1) in this paper using LeSage’s (1999) MATLAB functions in Applied
Econometrics using MATLAB.
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location related unobservable variables. The year dummies and the city dummies also help capture
the effects of compositions of loan types and coupon concentration of in a metropolitan area.

16

3.5 Empirical Results
Before the empirical results for Equation (1), the properties of important variables are
presented. Tables 3.2-1 and 3.2-2 present their summary statistics. On average there are 42,021
loans refinanced in a metropolitan area in a year during 1990 to 2000. However there exists great
variation. In Chicago, IL, 258,469 loans were refinanced during 1998. In Pittsburgh, PA, only
2,088 loans were refinanced during 1990. The standard deviation is 40,385 loans, nearly as many
as the mean. Housing prices, on average, increase $3,158 over a 5-year period that most borrowers
hold their mortgages before refinancing. Unlike the observations studied by Mattey and Wallace
(1998) that most declined in their housing prices, only 18 observations experienced housing price
depreciation among our 154 year-city observations. Housing price depreciation reached a
maximum of $6,532. Among the 18 observations, 7 observations experienced declines in mortgage
rates as well. The rest of the observations experienced increases in mortgage rates. The other 136
observations experienced housing price appreciation. Housing price appreciation reached a
maximum of $30,279. There are 48 out of the 136 observations that had increases in interest rates,
and 88 out of the 136 that experienced declines in interest rates.
Tables 3.3-1 to 3.3-3 cross-tabulates refinance rates for local housing price movements and
interest rate movements. Consistent with the discussion in Section 3.2, Table 3.3-1 clearly
indicates the need to control factors other than interest rate movements and local housing price
movements. Specifically, refinance rates are higher on average when interest rates have increased

The refinanced loans used in our study can be either FRMs or ARMs, or conventional loans, FHA-insured,
VA-guaranteed, or FmHA-insured loans.
16
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Table 3.2-1: Descriptive Statistics
Variables-Description
Refinancing loans = numbers of loans refinanced
Housing price changes
= differences between current median house value and median
house value 5 years ago in thousand dollars
Housing price depreciation
= absolute value of negative housing price changes
Conditional housing price depreciation
= housing price depreciation conditional on interest rates have
increased or unchanged over past 5 years
Housing price appreciation = positive housing price changes
Conditional housing price appreciation
= housing price appreciation conditional on interest rates have
declined over past 5 years
Current house prices = current median house value in thousand
dollars
Mortgaged households
= numbers of owner-occupied households with mortgages in
thousand households

n
154

Mean
42,021.084

Median
30,396.500

Maximum
258,469,000

Minimum
2,088.000

Standard Deviation
40,384.551

154

3.158

2.772

30.279

-6.532

3.872

154

0.220

0.000

6.532

0,000

0.900

154
154

0.0587
3.377

0.000
2.772

2.485
30.279

0.000
0.000

0.291
3.562

154

2.057

1.226

16.524

0.000

2.784

154

100.894

92.080

240.476

55.000

33.806

154

480.793

370.470

1203.920

156.615

292.172

Table 3.2-2: Descriptive Statistics for Housing Price Movements Excluding Zero Value Observations
n
Mean
Median
Maximum
Minimum
Variables-Description
Housing price depreciation= absolute value of negative housing
price changes in thousand dollars
Conditional housing price depreciation
= housing price depreciation conditional on interest rates have
increased or unchanged over past 5 years
Housing price appreciation
= positive housing price changes in thousand dollars
Conditional housing price appreciation
= housing price appreciation conditional on interest rates have
declined over past 5 years

Standard Deviation

18

1.879

1.133

6.532

0.076

1.996

11

0.822

0.635

2.485

0.076

0.780

136

3.824

3.0035

30.279

0.006

3.558

88

3.601

2.831

16.524

0.006

2.830
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Table 3.3-1: Contingency Table for Refinance Rates
Housing price movement
Interest rate movement
Housing price depreciation
Housing price appreciation
Interest rates increased
10.01% (11)
14.30% (48)
Interest rates declined
8.06% (7)
5.73% (88)
Total
9.25% (18)
8.75% (136)
Note: The numbers of observations are in the parentheses.

Total
13.50% (59)
5.90% (95)
8.81% (154)

Table 3.3-2: Contingency Tables for Refinance Rates for the 14 Metropolitan Areas
Atlanta, GA
Chicago, IL
Columbus, OH
Denver, CO
Detroit, MI
Houston, TX
Indianapolis, IN

Interest rate movement
Increased
Declined
Total
Increased
Declined
Total
Increased
Declined
Total
Increased
Declined
Total
Increased
Declined
Total
Increased
Declined
Total
Increased
Declined
Total

Housing price movement
Depreciation
Appreciation
4.13%
8.68%
4.13%
8.68%
14.79%
8.16%
14.79%
8.16%
11.12%
11.64%
7.17%
11.12%
8.51%
0.76%
10.58%
18.78%
0.76%
12.22%
5.43%
12.80%
5.43%
12.80%
8.32%
2.19%
5.34%
8.32%
3.77%
4.18%
9.56%
9.08%
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Total
8.26%
8.26%
9.36%
9.36%
11.51%
7.17%
8.75%
9.49%
18.78%
11.18%
12.13%
12.13%
3.21%
5.34%
4.18%
4.18%
9.56%
9.08%

(Table 3.3-2 continued)
Kansas City, MO-KS
Minneapolis-St. Paul,
MN-WI
Philadelphia, PA-NJ
Pittsburgh, PA
Rochester, NY
St. Louis, MO-IL
San Diego, CA

Interest rate movement
Increased
Declined
Total
Increased
Declined
Total
Increased
Declined
Total
Increased
Declined
Total
Increased
Declined
Total
Increased
Declined
Total
Increased
Declined
Total

Housing price movement
Depreciation
Appreciation
7.35%
8.51%
7.35%
8.51%
11.78%
11.78%
1.72%
1.72%
4.46%
4.48%
4.46%
12.11%
12.11%
8.87%
8.87%

9.98%
9.98%
4.87%
4.87%
7.33%
0.75%
6.67%
6.73%
6.73%
7.75%
14.49%
10.28%
14.65%
14.65%
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Total
8.40%
8.40%
10.14%
10.14%
4.87%
4.87%
7.33%
1.24%
6.22%
6.05%
4.48%
5.91%
9.39%
14.49%
10.78%
8.87%
14.65%
14.13%

Table 3.3-3: Contingency Tables for Refinance Rates from 1990 to 2000
Year
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000

Interest rate movement
Increased
Declined
Total
Increased
Declined
Total
Increased
Declined
Total
Increased
Declined
Total
Increased
Declined
Total
Increased
Declined
Total
Increased
Declined
Total
Increased
Declined
Total
Increased
Declined
Total
Increased
Declined
Total
Increased
Declined
Total

Housing price movement
Depreciation
Appreciation
0.59%
1.79%
0.59%
1.79%
1.98%
4.12%
1.98%
4.12%
7.09%
10.26%
15.18%
7.09%
11.49%
21.96%
16.96%
21.96%
16.96%
5.79%
5.83%
6.70%
5.79%
6.37%
6.46%
3.93%
6.46%
3.93%
8.29%
7.35%
8.29%
7.35%
9.71%
7.68%
9.71%
7.68%
10.69%
19.74%
27.42%
16.27%
19.74%
9.48%
12.72%
9.48%
12.72%
8.87%
6.61%
8.87%
6.61%
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Total
1.70%
1.70%
3.81%
3.81%
9.69%
15.18%
10.86%
17.32%
17.32%
5.82%
6.70%
6.32%
4.11%
4.11%
7.42%
7.42%
7.83%
7.83%
18.35%
27.42%
19.00%
11.79%
11.79%
8.87%
6.61%
6.77%

than when have decreased. One possible reason is that an ARM borrower is little sensitive to
historical interest rate increases and refinances to take advantages of the teaser offered by a new
loan (Ambrose and LaCour-Little, 2001) or to take home equity out from an overall investment or
consumption viewpoint, whenever the borrower has the ability to do so. Table 3.3-2 consists of 14
contingency tables each for a metropolitan area. The tables support this speculation. In the 8
metropolitan areas that experienced both interest rate increases and decreases, 5 metropolitan areas
had higher refinance rates on average when interest rates had decreased than had increased. When
pooled together for all years and metropolitan areas, finance rates on average are slightly higher
when local housing prices have depreciated than when have appreciated in Table 3-1. A possible
cause is that coupon concentration of existing FRMs varies over time.17 A FRM borrower would
like to refinance for a new loan with a lower interest rate as long as housing price depreciation does
not disqualify the borrower. Table 3-3 consists of 11 contingency tables each for a year from 1990
to 200. The tables support this speculation. In the 11 years, 6 years had higher refinance rates on
average when local housing price had appreciated than when had depreciated.
Table 3.4 presents the empirical results of Equations (1). Not surprisingly, the mortgaged
households number always has a significant and positive coefficient in all specifications. The
coefficient for current housing prices is always significant and positive in each specification. The
coefficient strongly supports the idea that the collateral constraint or the LTV ratio guideline has a
great influence on a borrower’s ability to refinance. This empirical result is consistent with the
results of previous studies such as Cunningham and Capone (1990), and PBMPR (1997 a and b).
The two studies show LTV ratio having a negative impact on mortgage refinancing. On the other
hand, Caplin, Freeman, and Tracy (1997) and Mattey and Wallace (1998) use local housing price
17 BKM (1999) show that coupon concentration of outstanding mortgages affects aggregate refinance rates over time.
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Table 3.4: Housing Price Movement and Refinancing Activity
Dependent variable: Ln (refinancing loans)
Independent variables:
Conditional
housing price depreciation
Housing price depreciation
Conditional
housing price appreciation
Housing price appreciation
Ln (Current house price)
Ln (mortgaged households)
n

Specification 1

Specification 2

Specification 3

β

β

β

t

t

Specification 4

β

t

t

-0.0253
-0.0362

-0.8051
-1.7167*

-0.0370

-1.7127*

-0.0319

0.0153
-0.0055
1.4965
0.8273

2.1872**
-1.1829
4.1650***
3.6873***

0.0150
-0.0049
1.5123
0.8313

2.1697**
-1.0565
4.3335***
3.6777***

0.0130

1.7760*

0.0168

2.5071**

1.4358
0.8171

4.4812***
3.6240***

1.5140
0.7827

4.8419***
3.4183***

154

154

154

-1.6182

154

30
29
28
27
k
2
R
0.9764
0.9763
0.9762
0.9757
Adjusted R2
0.9709
0.9710
0.9711
0.9708
Model F-value
176.7361***
184.2058***
191.4600***
196.3711***
F-value for RESET test
1.6027
1.5795
1.7537
1.6940
Note:
1. Refinancing loans = numbers of refinanced loans.
2. Housing price depreciation, and appreciation, and current housing prices are in thousand dollars.
3. Conditional housing price depreciation is housing price depreciation conditional on interest rates have increased or unchanged.
4. Conditional housing price appreciation is housing price appreciation conditional on interest rates have declined.
5. Mortgaged households are in thousand households.
6. All specifications include a constant and 13 city dummies and 10 year dummies not shown here.
7. The RESET test introduces the square, cubic and fourth powers of predicted Ln(refinancing loans) as additional regressors.
7. t-values in parentheses are based on heteroscedasticity-consistent errors.
9. *** significant at 1% level. 8. ** significant at 5 % level. 9. * significant at 10% level.
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movements alone to show the collateral constraint effect. Intuitively, housing movements pick up
both the effect of collateral constraint and the effect on cash-out refinancing.
The conditional housing price appreciation always has a significant and positive coefficient in
all specifications. This coefficient strongly supports that housing price appreciation boosts
cash-out refinancing when interest rates have declined. The housing price appreciation does not
have a significant coefficient. This coefficient is consistent with the idea that the borrower is likely
to apply a subordinate mortgage to cash out his home equity when his existing mortgage carries a
below-market interest rate.
The housing price depreciation has a significant and negative coefficient in 2 out of the 3
specifications. This result weakly supports that negative housing price changes decrease home
equity and, thus discourage cash-out refinancing. Nevertheless, the conditional housing price
depreciation does not have a significant and negative coefficient. This coefficient may reflect the
importance of home equity in cash-out refinancing. Without sufficient home equity, the borrower
is equally unlike to apply a cash-out refinance either when interest rates have declines or increased.
3.6 Conclusions
We provide evidence supporting that housing prices have a significant effect on aggregate
refinancing activities. Consistent with Mattey and Wallace (1998), we have evidence showing the
collateral constraint effect of housing prices on aggregate refinancing activity. In contrast to
previous studies, we further contribute the refinancing literature by providing empirical evidence
consistent with our proposed relations between housing price movements and aggregate cash-out
refinancing activities.
We have evidence supports the idea that local housing price changes interacting with
mortgage rate movements affect cash-out refinancing. Our evidence shows that positive
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appreciation in housing price expedites the borrower to refinance in response to the associated
increased borrowing capacity when mortgage rates have declined. On the other hand, depreciation
in housing price may hold down the borrower to refinance.
Our results have important implications. Our results confirm that housing price dynamics play
an important role in estimating refinancing risk and, therefore, are important in adequately pricing
mortgages and MBS. In particular, we show that housing price movements, not only depreciation
pointed out by DSW (2001) but also appreciation, should be included in modeling total termination
risks of MBS.
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CHAPTER 4
MONITORING AND DIVIDEND POLICY OF REITS
UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
4.1. Introduction
Under the assumption that the capital market is perfect and investment decisions are
independent, dividends are irrelevant to a firm’s value because investors could create their own
dividends by selling or borrowing against their portfolios. Despite this, we observe that a firm
pays out dividends and its stock price changes upon its dividend announcements.
Considering that mangers have information unavailable to external market participants,
finance researchers have proposed agency costs and signaling to explain dividend policy. The
two competing explanations both receive empirical support, in particular, in the industry of real
estate investment trusts (REITs). Wang, Erickson, and Gau (1993; WEG hereafter) support
agency-cost theories, while Bradley, Capozza, and Seguin (1998; BCS hereafter) support
signaling theories. However, neither of the two studies empirically takes into account the
mandatory 95% (90% beginning in 2001) payout requirement of REIT taxable income.1 In
addition, neither one considers Easterbrook’s (1984) monitoring rationale for paying dividends.
By introducing proxies for taxable income and monitoring, we provide evidence that agency-cost
explanations dominate signaling explanations for dividends policy of inefficiently monitored
REITs. This evidence confirms Easterbrook’s (1984) rationale and differs from the evidence
provided by previous studies attempting distinguish signaling and agency cost explanations.
Filbeck and Mullineaux (1999 and 1993) as well as BCS (1998) have attempted to
distinguish between the two competing dividend explanations: signaling and agency costs.

1

REITs are required to pay out at 95% (90% beginning in 2001) of their taxable income in form of dividend to
retain their REIT status (Internal Revenue Service, 2002).
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Examining bank holding companies that are highly monitored by regulators, Filbeck and
Mullineaux (1993) find that their results of stock price reaction on dividend announcements
support signaling explanations, and Filbeck and Mullineaux (1999) find that agency costs are
almost irrelevant to dividend paying of bank holding companies. Taking together their two
studies, Filbeck and Mullineaux (1993 and 1999) provide evidence that signaling explanations
dominate agency-cost explanations for dividends policy of effectively monitored firms.
Examining REITs, BCS (1998) find a negative relationship between cash flow volatility and
dividend distribution. They conclude that their evidence supports signaling theories but is
inconsistent with agency-cost theories. In other words, BCS’s (1998) evidence shows that
signaling explanations dominate agency-cost explanations for dividends policy of a pool of firms
that may be or may not be effectively monitored. However, neither of Filbeck and Mullineaux
(1993 and 1999) nor BCS (1998) examined the dominance between signaling explanations and
agency-cost explanations for firms that are not effectively monitored.
We argue that the dominance between the two dividend policy explanations provided in the
existing literature may be reversed for firms that are not effectively monitored based on two
reasons. First, Easterbrook’s (1984) rationale of substitution among agency-cost control devices
suggests agency-cost explanations are valid only for firms that are not effectively monitored.
This rationale implies that samples in both Filbeck and Mullineaux (1993 and 1999) and BCS
(1998) are biased against agency-cost explanations and in favor of signaling explanations.
Second, BCS’s (1998) signaling model implicitly assumes that managers are maximizing
shareholders’ wealth and the market knows it. Under this assumption, the market can infer a
firm’s private information from its manager’ actions. Without this assumption, the market may
not be able to infer information. Thus, the manager may not be able to communicate credible
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signals to the market. For instance, mangers with compensation closely tied with current firm
value have incentives to send false signals with a high level of dividends. Managers working in
firms that are not effectively monitored are more likely to maximize their own wealth instead of
shareholders wealth than managers in effectively monitored firms. Thus, firms that are not
effectively monitored are less likely to signal credibly. This reasoning implies the dividend
signaling model may be dominated by agency-cost explanations in explaining dividend policy
for firms that are not effectively monitored.
Different from BCS (1998), we do not rely solely on cash flow volatility to distinguish the
dominance between signaling explanations and agency-cost explanations. Following Noronha,
Shome, and Morgan (1996, NSM hereafter), we stratify firms into “non-monitored firms” and
“monitored firms” to take into account the Easterbrook’s (1984) rationale. Adopting the
encompassing principle, we then artificially nest the models for the two explanations to examine
their dominance for non-monitored firms and monitored firms separately (Greene, 200).
The next section presents our reason for using measures other than cash flow volatility
alone to distinguish signaling explanations and agency-cost explanations. The third section
describes the sample and empirical methodology in detail. The fourth section presents the
empirical results. The last section contains conclusions.
4.2 Cash Flow Volatility and Dividends
In this section, we present our reason for not using cash flow volatility alone to distinguish
signaling explanations and agency-cost explanations. This section is comprised of two parts. The
first part discusses the negative relationship between dividend distribution and cash flow
volatility in the dividend-signaling framework. On the other hand, the second part discusses the
ambiguous relation in the agency-cost framework. The discussion concludes that agency-cost
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explanations of dividend do not predict a determinate direction of the relationship between
dividend level and cash flow volatility. Therefore we differ from BCS (1998) and do not use the
sign of the relationship alone to determine the dominance between the signaling explanations and
the agency-cost explanations.
4.2.1 Cash Flow Volatility in the Dividend-Signaling Framework
At least three dividend signaling papers discuss the relation between dividend distribution
and cash flow volatility: Eades (1982), Kale and Noe (1990), and BCS (1998).2 All three
dividend-signaling papers assume either explicitly or implicitly that firms are the managers are
perfectly aligned with current shareholders. In other words, the managers are maximizing their
firm values that are equivalent to their current shareholders’ wealth.3 In this case, we can divide
agents into two groups: firms (managers and current shareholders) and the market (remaining
agents). Firms have information unavailable to the market. Firms signal the asymmetric
information to the market with dividend distribution. Nevertheless, the asymmetric information
is different in the three papers. Specifically, dividends signal the expected future cash flow both
in Eades’ (1982) paper and BCS’s (1998) paper, and the cash flow volatility in Kale and Noe’s
(1990) paper.
In Eades’ (1982) and BCS’s (1998) models, the asymmetric information is expected future
cash flow. However, both firms and the market know the variance of the future cash flow. Firms
signal the expected cash flow to the market to maximize the current firm value by distributing
dividend. The market infers the expected cash flow from the promised dividend. Firms incur a

2

Actually Eades (1982) stated the relation between dividend level and variance of liquidation value of a firm in their
one-period signaling model. Since the liquidation value is the only cash flow at the end of one period, the relation
can be viewed as one between dividend level and cash flow volatility. Kale and Noe (1990) shared the same
interpretation here.
3
Current shareholder’s wealth is not necessarily equal to current market price of a firm under asymmetric
information.
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market-imposed penalty when realized future cash flow is short of the promised dividend. The
market-imposed penalty is the signaling cost that increases with the degree of the shortfall
between realized future cash flow and the promised dividend. Increases in the expected cash
flow lower the expected cost of signaling by reducing the expected shortfall, and thus raise the
level of dividend required for credible signaling. This implies a positive relationship between
dividend level and expected cash flow. On the other hand, firms with known higher cash flow
volatility are more likely to have a larger shortfall with a given level of dividend, and thus need a
lower level of dividend to send a credible signal. This implies a negative relationship between
dividend level and cash flow volatility.
Different from Eades’ (1982) and BCS’s (1998) models, both firms and the market know
the expected future cash flow in Kale and Noe’s (1990) model. Now the asymmetric information
is volatility of expected future cash flow. So the information content that firms want to signal
and the market wants to infer from dividend is cash flow volatility. Nevertheless, the intuitions
behind the relationship between dividend and cash flow volatility, as well as expected future
cash flows, are very similar to those in Eades’ (1982) model. Firms have to obtain external
financing to meet the shortfall between realized future cash flow and promised dividend. The
external financing cost which increases with the degree of the shortfall is the signaling cost.
Increases in cash flow volatility raise the expected external financing cost associated with a
given level of dividend, which lowers the level of dividend necessary for credible signaling.4 On
the other hand, firms with known higher expected future cash flows are less likely to incur the
signaling cost, and thus require a higher level of dividend to signal credibly.

4

Actually Kale and Noe’s (1990) separate cash flow volatility into systematic risk and unsystematic risk. They
predict a negative relation between dividend level and unsystematic risk. But they do not a deterministic prediction
about the sign of the relation between dividend level and systematic risk. Nevertheless the existing empirical
evidence also suggests a negative relation between dividend level and systematic risk (see BCS, 1998).
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To sum up, the three dividend signaling models all predict a negative (positive) relationship
between dividend level and cash flow volatility (expected future cash flow). In addition to the
theoretical prediction, Eades (1982) and BCS (1998) also provide empirical evidence supporting
the negative (positive) relationship. Therefore, we conclude that the relationship between
dividend and cash flow volatility is negative in the signaling framework.
4.2.2 Cash Flow Volatility in the Agency-Cost framework
At least two studies discuss the relation between cash flow volatility and dividend
distribution in the agency-cost framework: Rozeff (1982) and BCS (1998). Nevertheless, the two
studies have different predictions about the relationship. Rozeff (1982) predicts a negative
relationship between dividend level and cash flow volatility in the agency-cost framework.5
Notice Rozeff’s (1982) prediction is the same as the prediction of the three signaling models
discussed before. In other words, both the signaling models of Eades (1982), Kale and Noe
(1990), as well as BCS (1998), and the agency-cost model of Rozeff (1982) predict a negative
relationship between dividend level and cash flow volatility. On the other hand, BCS (1998)
predict a positive relationship between cash flow volatility and dividend distribution in the
agency-cost framework.
Rozeff (1982) argues that cash flow volatility increases a firm’s dependence on external
financing given fixed investment opportunities. External financing is costly compared to internal
financing. Dividend payments reduce the available amount of internal financing when needed for
investment. Therefore the opportunity cost of dividends for a firm with higher cash flow
volatility is higher than a firm with lower volatility. The transaction cost effect induces a
negative relationship between cash flow volatility and dividend payout. One can also view this

5

See page 254 in Rozeff (1982).
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argument from under-investment risk. An increase in cash flow volatility increases underinvestment risk given fixed available financing. Dividend payments reduce the available
financing under a firm’s control. To avoid under-investment, a firm needs to increase its amount
from external financing and thus incurs extra transaction costs.
An increase in cash flow volatility, however, also increases over-investment risk. Overinvestment risk increases because investors attribute deviation in cash flows to the actions of
corporate management or to the factors beyond management’s control with less precision.
Dividend payments reduce the funds under management’s discretion. Hence dividend
distributions can reduce over-investment risk. From this point of view, BCS (1998) argue that a
positive relationship exists between cash flow volatility and dividend payout under agency-cost
explanations.6
Agency-cost explanations, therefore, overall do yield a determinate prediction about the
relationship between cash flow volatility and dividend distribution. As a result, examining the
link between cash flow volatility and dividend distribution alone cannot clearly distinguish
agency cost and signaling theories of dividends. Therefore we differ from BCS (1998) and do not
only use the sign of the relationship to determine the dominance between the signaling
explanations and the agency-cost explanations.
4.3 The Sample and Empirical Methodology
This section consists of two parts. The first part describes our data selection and the
properties of the data. The second part explains the empirical methodology used in this study.

6

See page 556 in BCS (1998).
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4.3.1 The Sample
We obtained the initial list of REITs for this study from Research Insight by searching
companies with SIC code 6798. We then collected relevant annual firm-specific data for REITs
from the Research Insight and the Academic Universe for the period 1987 through 1998.
Dividends, taxable income, market values of assets, leverage ratios, trading volumes, numbers of
common shares, returns on total assets, and numbers of common stockholders are from the
Research Insight.7 Funds from operations (FFO) come computed annually following Graham and
Knight (2000) from the Research Insight files as well.8 Other annual data comes from the
Academic Universe. Real estate investment information and managers and directors’ stock
holdings are from 10-K reports and proxy statements. Equity, mortgage, or hybrid REITs are
identified from balance sheets in 10-K reports to shareholders. All hybrid REITs and mortgage
REITs are dropped. REITs in merger or liquidating processes are also dropped. This leads to a
final sample consisting of 332 observations of equity REITs.
Table 4.1 contains descriptive statistics for all REITs used in this study and shows that there
is significant variation in REIT dividend policy. Specifically, there are 19 (5.72%) out of 332
observations paying no cash dividend. The REITs pay $31.86 million in dividend a year on
average, with a standard deviation of $38.82 million. There are 252 (75.90%) out of 332
observations paying dividend more than the mandatory 95% payout requirement. Excess
dividend above the 95% distribution requirement has a mean of $7.17 million and a standard
deviation of $12.17 million.

7

Pretax income, taxable income in concept, reported in the Research Insight is used as a proxy for taxable income
reported by REITs to the Internal Revenue Service.
8
Graham and Knight (2000) consider FFO as a cash flow measure for REITs and define FFO as net income plus
depreciation, minority interest income, and extraordinary items, and excluding gain or loss on sales of property,
plant and equipment.
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics
Variable
Dividend ($ millions)
Excess dividend ($ millions)
Dividend per share ($)
Dividend yield (%)
Dividend payout (%)
Dividends / funds from operations (%)
Fund from operations ($ millions)
Excess fund from operations ($ millions)
Net income ($ millions)
Taxable income ($ millions)
Market value ($ millions)
Leverage ratio (%)
States with real estate investment
Trading volume/ number of common shares
Asset growth ratio (%)
ROA (%)
Insider ownership (%)
Price to book ratio (%)
Number of common shareholders (thousands)
Blockholders' ownership (%)

Label
DV
EXDV
DIVPS
DY
DP
DV/FFO
FFO
EXFFO
NI
TI
MV
LEVER
STATE
INCENTIVE
GR
ROA
INS
PTB
STOCK
BLOCK

n
332
332
332
332
332
332
332
332
332
332
332
332
332
332
332
332
332
332
332
332

Mean
31.8614
7.1768
4.5050
9.9544
126.6019
77.9544
47.4722
18.4700
25.9130
30.2857
449.2393
43.0130
10.2801
56.2238
111.8029
3.3249
13.7684
184.3660
6.9602
14.4367
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Std Dev
38.8208
12.1746
33.1397
43.7967
246.6806
136.0732
66.3656
31.9288
36.0694
40.7256
678.6196
18.8130
8.1532
42.5398
118.2091
5.0780
14.7651
156.7867
16.2976
14.9879

Minimum
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
-1935.1000
-1165.7822
-15.1600
-46.0964
-13.0000
-11.3020
1.0430
0.0000
1.0000
4.5416
-35.3320
-55.1510
0.0790
11.9000
0.0190
0.0000

Maximum
350.1830
107.7167
540.1200
801.7780
1909.3700
1769.7313
676.3100
301.1788
349.0290
394.8750
7875.6000
92.1604
43.0000
518.1000
1456.0300
15.9738
77.9000
1547.8500
161.6400
77.0100

For the REITs, dividend per share on average is $4.50 with a standard deviation of $33.14.
Dividend yield is 9.95% of share price on average and has a standard deviation of 43.80%.
Dividend payout measured in net income before extraordinary items is 126.60% on average.
Dividend payout expressed as a proportion of funds from operations (FFO) has a mean of about
78% and has a standard deviation of 136%.
4.3.2 Empirical Methodology
Our empirical methodology is in the spirit of NSM (1996). Following NSM (1996), we
stratify observations into “non-monitored firms,” or “monitored firms” as shown in Figure 4.1.
The non-monitored firms do not have non-dividend monitoring, and the monitored firms are
monitored with non-divined devices. All REITs are stratified into two groups first: one group
with both below mean price-to-book (PTB) ratios and below mean outside blockholders’
ownership (BLOCK), and the other group with above mean PTB ratios or above mean BLOCK.
Because the transition from being non-monitored to being monitored may be gradual, we
drop observations near the means to increase the distinction between non-monitored firms and
monitored firms. Specifically, we drop observations with above 80th percentile of below mean
PTB ratios or with above 80th percentile of below mean block-ownerships for the first group.
This procedure leaves 91 observations with both below 80th percentile of below mean PTB ratios
and below 80th percentile of below mean block ownerships for non-monitored firms.9 We drop
observations with below 80th percentile of PTB ratios or with below 80th percentile of blockownerships for the second group. This procedure leaves 123 observations for monitored firms.10

9

Among the 91 observations for non-monitored firms, there are 30 (32.97%) observations paying dividend no more
than the mandatory 95% payout requirement.
10
Among the 123 observations for non-monitored firms, there are 28 (22.76%) observations paying dividend no
more than the mandatory 95% payout requirement.

71

Above Mean
Price-to-Book (PTB) Ratio

Above Mean
Outside Blockholders’
Ownership (BLOCK)

Monitored Firms

Below Mean
Price-to-Book (PTB) Ratio

Monitored Firms

Below 80th Percentile of PTB Ratios
Above 80th Percentile of
Below Mean PTB Ratios
Below
80th
Percentile
of Blocks

Above
80th
Monitored Firms
Percentile
Non-Monitored Firms
of Below
Mean
Blocks
Figure 4.1: Classification of Non-Monitored Firms and Monitored Firms
Below Mean
Outside Blockholders’
Ownership (BLOCK)
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As a result, we have 214 observations total in examining the dominance between signaling
explanations and agency-cost explanations for REIT dividend policy.
Then, we examine dividend-signaling explanations, and agency-cost explanations: first for
non-monitored firms and then for monitored firms. For non-monitored firms, we expect to find
distinct supporting evidence for agency-cost explanations but not for signaling explanations. On
the other hand, for monitored firms, we expect to find distinct evidence supporting signaling
explanations but no distinct supporting agency-cost explanations. In other words, as shown in
Figure 4.2, agency cost explanations are hypothesized dominating signaling explanations for the
non-monitored firms and vice versa for the monitored firms. 11
To examine empirically dividend-signaling explanations, we construct Equation (1) with the
expected sign for each independent variable in the parentheses.
EXDV = F s ( EXFFO, Lagged EXFFO, MV , LEVER, STATE, INCENTIVE )

(1)

where
EXDV = Annual cash dividend paid for common stocks in excess of the mandatory

payout requirement (million dollars) during a fiscal year12;
EXFFO = FFO in excess of cash flow needed for the mandatory payout requirement for

the current fiscal year (million dollars) ( + ) ;
lagged EXFFO = EXFFO for the previous fiscal year (million dollars) ( none ) ;

11

We do not consider all non-dividend monitoring devices in this study. Nevertheless, ignoring the other nondividend monitoring devices bias against us to find the dominance of agency cost explanations over signaling
explanations for our non-monitored firms. On the other hand, ignoring the other non-dividend monitoring devices
should bias against us to find the dominance of signaling explanations over agency cost explanations for our
monitored firms. As a result, our findings are stronger than they appear.
12
The three signaling models suggest the total dividend as the dependent variable. Some studies use dividend yields
as the dependent variable. This dividend yield approach is equivalent to scale total dividend with expected future
cash flow in the denominator of the dependent variable or to include expected future cash flow as an independent
variable (Eades, 1982).
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Non-Monitored Firms

Monitored Firms

Signaling Explanations

Expecting No Distinct
Supporting Evidence

Expecting Distinct
Supporting Evidence

Agency-Cost
Explanations

Expecting Distinct
Supporting Evidence

Expecting No Distinct
Supporting Evidence

Expected Dominance

Dominant Explanations:
Agency-Cost

Dominant Explanations:
Signaling

Figure 4.2: Monitoring and Expected Dominance
between Dividend Signaling and Agency-Cost Explanations
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MV = Market value of assets (million dollars) at the end of the previous fiscal year ( + ) ;
LEVER =

Leverage ratio (book debt-to-asset ratio) in percentage at the end of the

previous fiscal year ( − ) ;
STATE = Geographic diversification measured by the number of states with real estate

investment for an REIT at the end of the previous fiscal year ( + ) ;
INCENTIVE = Signaling incentive measured by the trading volume of a firm shares

normalized for shares outstanding in the previous year (annual fiscal trading volume
/ annual common shares for basic earnings per share) ( + ) .
As concluded in Section 4.2.1, the three dividend-signaling explanations hypothesize that
dividend levels are positively correlated with expected cash flows and negatively correlated with
cash flow volatility. We include five proxies for expected cash flows and cash flow volatility in
Equation (1). The first two independent variables, EXFFO and lagged EXFFO, are used to
account for expected future cash flow in excess of cash flow needed to retain a REIT status.
Including the two variables separately is similar to including previous cash flow and the actual
changes in cash flows in BCS (1998). In addition, including the two variables separately allows
us to nest the signaling model with the agency cost model specified later on. A positive
coefficient is hypothesized for EXFFO, and no sign is hypothesized for the coefficient for
lagged EXFFO.
The next three variables, MV , LEVER, and STATE , are proxies for cash-flow volatility.
The use of MV and LEVER are followed from BCS (1998). MV is expected to be negatively
correlated with cash flow volatility and thus is hypothesized to have a positive coefficient. This
expectation arises because REITs with larger market values are associated with larger portfolios
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that contain a larger number of discrete assets. If cash flows to these assets are not perfectly
correlated, portfolio with larger number of discrete assets will experience lower volatility of cash
flows from operations. LEVER is expected to be positively correlated with cash flow volatility
and thus is hypothesized to have a negative coefficient. This hypothesis is based on the positive
effect of financial leverage on volatility of cash flows to shareholders, holding the cash flows
from operation constant.
In addition to naïve diversification considered in MV , systematic diversification adopted
by REITs reduces cash flow volatility as well. BCS (1998) construct geographic and propertytype Herfindahl indices to account for systematic diversification. They find that only the
geographic indices are significantly related to REIT dividends. Imitating the number of segments
used in the finance diversification literature, we measure the geographic diversification with the
number of states where an equity REIT has real estate investments. This index can vary from 1
for a geographically concentrated equity REIT to 50 for a well-diversified equity REIT.
In one-period models of Eades (1982) and BCS (1998), there is equivalently only one type
of shareholder who has the same objective function of balancing signaling benefits and signaling
costs, thus having the same incentive to signal. In the two-period model of Kale and Noe (1990),
there are two types of shareholders: sellers and stayers. Sellers, who plan to sell out their shares,
have an incentive to signal to have higher current market price for their shares. On the other
hand, stayers, who plan to hold their shares for the longer run, have an incentive to avoid
signaling costs. Facing the potential conflicts of interest between the current shareholders,
mangers maximize a weighted average of the intrinsic value and the current market value of the
firm.13 When placing more weight on the current market value of the firm, managers will

13

The intrinsic value of a firm equals the market value of the firm under full information.
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distribute more dividend (Kale and Noe, 1990). To account for this effect, we include
INCENTIVE which is a proxy for the weight on the current market value in Equation (1), in

addition to proxies for expected future cash flows and cash flow volatility.
To examine empirically dividend-signaling explanations, we construct Equation (2) with the
expected sign for each independent variable in the parentheses.
EXDV = F a ( EXFFO, MV , LEVER, STATE , GR, ROA, STOCK , INS )

(2)

where
EXFFO = FFO in excess of cash flow needed for the mandatory payout requirement for

the current fiscal year (million dollars) ( + ) ;
MV = Market value of assets (million dollars) at the end of the previous fiscal year

( none ) ;
LEVER =

Leverage ratio (book debt-to-asset ratio) in percentage at the end of the

previous fiscal year ( none ) ;
STATE = Geographic diversification measured by the number of states with real estate

investment for an REIT at the end of the previous fiscal year ( none ) ;
GR = Realized growth rate of total assets for the previous fiscal year ( − ) ;
ROA = Return on total assets for the previous fiscal year ( − ) ;
STOCK = Outsiders’ ownership dispersion measured by the number of common

stockholders (thousands) at the end of previous fiscal year ( + ) 14;

14

The 100-shareholder test for qualifying as a REIT applies to the total number of both common shareholders and
preferred shareholders (Brandon, 1997).
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INS = Insiders’ ownership measured by the fraction of voting shares held by insiders at

the end of previous fiscal year or the beginning of the current fiscal year ( − ) .
Unlike the three dividend-signaling models, mangers are not perfect agents of shareholders,
because they pursue their own interests whenever they can in agency-cost models (Easterbrook,
1984). In the agency cost framework, dividend policy balances the agency costs of external
equity and transaction costs of external financing (Rozeff, 1982). A positive relationship between
dividend level and EXFFO is hypothesized. This hypothesis arises because more cash flows
give mangers more discretion to over-invest in non-positive net present value projects. As a
result, shareholders demand more dividends than they would otherwise. Including the cash flow
variable as an explanatory variable and dividend as the dependent variable is similar to putting
dividend payout as the dependent variable in other studies. However, our approach allows us the
nest the agency cost model with the signaling model specified before. As discussed in Section
4.2.2, cash flow volatility influences dividend policy in two opposing ways. Cash flow volatility
increases over-investment risk but also under-investment risk (or expected costs of external
financing). Therefore, unlike signaling explanations, no determinate signs are hypothesized for
the next three variables, MV , LEVER, and STATE , that are proxies for cash-flow volatility.
Following Rozeff (1982) and WEG (1993), we include GR in the equation of agency-cost
explanations. A negative relationship is hypothesized between dividend level and GR. Rozeff
(1982) and WEG (1993) hypothesize this negative relationship because a firm experiencing or
anticipating a rapid growth would tend to retain funds to minimize the frequency of raising new
capital. We also include ROA in Equation (2) because WEG (1993) also hypothesize and show a
negative relationship between ROA and dividend distribution. The negative relationship is
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hypothesized because shareholders may feel less pressure to monitor the investment decisions of
managers when the firm has a superior historical investment performance.
In addition, we also include STOCK and INS , following Rozeff (1982). A positive
relationship between STOCK and dividend level and a negative relation between INS and
dividend distribution are hypothesized. The positive relationship for STOCK is hypothesized
because outside shareholders with more concentration of ownership are more likely to influence
insider behavior, thereby reducing agency costs and leading to a lower dividend distribution. The
negative relationship for INS is hypothesized because as outside equity holders own a larger
share of the equity, they will demand a higher dividend as part of the optimum-monitoring
package.
Having specified the signaling model and the agency cost model, we artificially nest
Equations (1) and (2) into the following equation (Greene, 2000):
EXDV = F ( EXFFO, Lagged EXFFO, MV , LEVER, STATE , GR, ROA, STOCK , INS , INCENTIVE )
By examining the log-likelihoods and the coefficients of the variables in the three equations, we
are able to distinguish the dominance between signaling explanations and agency cost
explanations.
4.4 Empirical Results
Computed from the log-likelihoods of Specification 2 of Tables 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4, the chisquared statistic for the Chow test is 71.08, which is significant at 1% level. This result indicates
a structure difference between non-monitored and monitored firms and leads us to investigate the
dominance between signaling and agency cost explanations for non-monitored and monitored
firms separately. With this support, our discussion of empirical results consists of two parts. The
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Table 4.2: Dividend Models for All Firms
Dependent variable: EXDV
Independent
variable

Constant
EXFFO (+)
Lagged EXFFO
MV
LEVER
STATE
GR (-)
ROA (-)
STOCK (+)
INS (-)
INCENTIVE (+)
Log-Likelihood

k
n

2

Specification 1
Homoscedastic
β
0.9145
[0.7592]
0.1512
[0.0065]***
0.1899
[0.0049]***
0.0033
[0.3225]
-0.0630
[0.1402]
0.1047
[0.3656]
0.0109
[0.0665]*
0.2087
[0.2440]
-0.0206
[0.7966]
-0.1492
[0.0173]**
-0.0077
[0.7731]
-632.1748
11
214

Marginal
effects
0.5825
[0.7602]
0.0963
[0.0066]***
0.1210
[0.0051]***
0.0021
[0.3240]
-0.0401
[0.1417]
0.0667
[0.3663]
0.0070
[0.0664]*
0.1330
[0.2411]
-0.0132
[0.7965]
-0.0950
[0.0167]**
-0.0049
[0.7732]

Heteroscedastic
β
-0.6682
[0.6086]
0.3800
[0.0000]***
-0.0375
[0.5240]
-0.0021
[0.5446]
0.0166
[0.2979]
-0.0132
[0.8356]
0.0029
[0.0059]***
0.0927
[0.1599]
0.0786
[0.1188]
-0.0358
[0.1049]
0.0088
[0.5068]
-538.1187
21
214

α
3.8590
[0.0001]***
-0.0227
[0.0001]***
-0.0172
[0.0129]**
0.0026
[0.0000]***
-0.0023
[0.5083]
-0.0100
[0.3313]
-0.0051
[0.0000]***
-0.0622
[0.0156]**
-0.0004
[0.9355]
0.0045
[0.3902]
0.0181
[0.0000]***

Marginal
effects
-0.5372
[0.6096]
0.3236
[0.0000]***
-0.0164
[0.7335]
-0.0038
[0.1426]
0.0152
[0.2534]
-0.0027
[0.9570]
0.0064
[0.0000]***
0.1240
[0.1240]
0.0635
[0.1218]
-0.0323
[0.0619]*
-0.0074
[0.4974]

Note: 1. The variance of regression errors is assumed to be in the form Ti  exp B ax i in Specification 2.
2

2. * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.
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Table 4.3: Dividend Models for Non-Monitored Firms
Dependent variable: EXDV
Independent variable Specification 1
2
3
4
Homoscedastic Marginal Heteroscedastic
Marginal Heteroscedastic
Marginal Heteroscedastic
Marginal
effects
effects
effects
effects
β
β
α
β
α
β
α
Constant
-3.8075
-2.2030
2.2088
1.2012
1.6920
0.6306
0.2796
0.5061
1.9161
1.9087
1.1778
[0.3797]
[0.3671]
[0.3663]
[0.2493]
[0.3936]
[0.6504]
[0.0089]*** [0.6418]
[0.4152]
[0.1023]
[0.4370]
EXFFO (+)
0.1573
0.0910
0.3347
-0.0401
0.2588
0.4484
-0.0764
0.3968
0.5981
-0.0075
0.3677
[0.2254]
[0.2225]
[0.0006]*** [0.0074]*** [0.0004]*** [0.0016]*** [0.0000]*** [0.0000]*** [0.0000]*** [0.5908]
[0.0000]***
Lagged EXFFO
0.0936
0.2225
-0.0739
-0.0378
-0.0544
0.0204
0.0487
-0.0071
[0.5983]
[0.5969]
[0.3661]
[0.1871]
[0.3762]
[0.8652]
[0.0084]*** [0.9392]
MV
-0.0109
-0.0063
-0.0046
0.0043
-0.0038
0.0097
0.0050
0.0054
-0.0132
0.0044
-0.0018
[0.2931]
[0.2895]
[0.6074]
[0.0022]*** [0.5304]
[0.2313]
[0.0000]*** [0.3957]
[0.0178]** [0.0105]** [0.6022]
LEVER
0.0612
0.0354
-0.0061
0.0244
-0.0061
-0.0139
0.0295
-0.0253
-0.0095
0.0507
0.0670
[0.3679]
[0.3646]
[0.8639]
[0.0326]** [0.8246]
[0.5574]
[0.0001]*** [0.1844]
[0.7708]
[0.0000]*** [0.0123]**
STATE
-0.2397
-0.1387
-0.1412
-0.0221
-0.1069
-0.1040
-0.0283
-0.0698
-0.1104
-0.0017
-0.0703
[0.1431]
[0.1417]
[0.1133]
[0.3783]
[0.1095]
[0.3002]
[0.1738]
[0.3907]
[0.0474]** [0.9418]
[0.1512]
GR (-)
-0.0214
-0.0124
0.0031
-0.0059
0.0028
0.0133
-0.0182
-0.0180
[0.2203]
[0.2242]
[0.5527]
[0.0194]*** [0.4306]
[0.0822]* [0.0000]*** [0.0000]***
ROA (-)
0.3871
0.2239
-0.0135
-0.0952
-0.0046
0.0771
0.0181
0.0734
[0.2894]
[0.2764]
[0.9521]
[0.2022]
[0.9778]
[0.6348]
[0.7832]
[0.5541]
STOCK (+)
0.4120
0.2384
0.1801
0.0065
0.1376
0.1271
-0.0147
0.0570
[0.0002]*** [0.0003]*** [0.0082]*** [0.5681]
[0.0034]***
[0.0047]*** [0.2222]
[0.0645]*
INS (-)
-0.0554
-0.0320
-0.0701
-0.0180
-0.0526
-0.1571
0.0000
-0.0966
[0.4531]
[0.4527]
[0.0298]** [0.2546]
[0.0411]**
[0.0000]*** [0.9965]
[0.0000]***
INCENTIVE (+)
0.1125
0.0651
0.0198
0.0226
0.0138
-0.0039
-0.0283
-0.0150
[0.0049]*** [0.0059]*** [0.5276]
[0.0000]*** [0.5350]
[0.9083]
[0.0000]*** [0.5373]
Log-Likelihood
-238.8458
-181.3314
-191.6688
-191.8703
k
11
21
13
17
n
91
91
91
91
2
Note: 1. The variance of regression errors is assumed to be in the form Ti  exp B ax i in Specifications 2, 3, and 4.
2. * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.
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Table 4.4: Dividend Models for Monitored Firms
Dependent variable: EXDV
2
3
4
Independent variable Specification 1
Homoscedastic Marginal Heteroscedastic
Marginal Heteroscedastic
Marginal Heteroscedastic
Marginal
effects
effects
effects
effects
β
β
α
β
α
β
α
Constant
4.5668
3.2102
0.7958
17.9713
0.6992
1.7167
3.9382
1.3206
1.2158
15.7341
0.9997
[0.3652]
[0.3705]
[0.7881]
[0.0316]** [0.7891]
[0.5167] [0.0002]*** [0.5153] [0.5844]
[0.0178]** [0.5801]
EXFFO (+)
0.1851
0.1301
0.5583
-0.0029
0.4972
0.2173
-0.0057
0.1682
0.2912
-0.0051
0.2395
[0.0022]*** [0.0024]*** [0.0000]*** [0.7359]
[0.0000]*** [0.0172]** [0.3531]
[0.0154]** [0.0000]*** [0.2887]
[0.0002]***
Lagged EXFFO
0.1735
0.1220
-0.1020
-0.0328
-0.0127
0.0624
-0.0071
0.0493
[0.0177]**
[0.0183]** [0.1932]
[0.0005]*** [0.8667]
[0.4210] [0.2626]
[0.4022]
MV
0.0041
0.0029
-0.0067
0.0020
-0.0105
-0.0017
0.0016
-0.0016
-0.0017
0.0018
-0.0034
[0.2603]
[0.2621]
[0.1149]
[0.0000]*** [0.0075]*** [0.7105] [0.0000]*** [0.6138] [0.6607]
[0.0035]*** [0.2596]
LEVER
-0.0873
-0.0614
-0.0230
-0.0189
0.0242
-0.0166
-0.0061
-0.0116
-0.0167
-0.0175
0.0068
[0.1313]
[0.1327]
[0.3063]
[0.0000]*** [0.2833]
[0.5933] [0.1170]
[0.6264] [0.4291]
[0.0038]*** [0.7252]
STATE
0.2911
0.2046
0.0175
0.0228
-0.0381
0.0147
-0.0119
0.0136
0.0156
0.0009
0.0118
[0.0444]**
[0.0447]** [0.8341]
[0.1739]
[0.6528]
[0.8932] [0.3102]
[0.8698] [0.8360]
[0.9450]
[0.8536]
GR (-)
0.0186
0.0130
0.0015
-0.0086
0.0215
0.0031
-0.0022
0.0051
[0.0037]*** [0.0037]*** [0.5913]
[0.0000]*** [0.0000]***
[0.1901]
[0.0038]*** [0.0570]*
ROA (-)
0.1577
0.0037
0.0648
-0.1516
0.4126
0.1138
-0.1327
0.2487
[0.6188]
[0.6179]
[0.6416]
[0.0006]*** [0.0133]**
[0.1577]
[0.0000]*** [0.0089]***
STOCK (+)
-0.4143
-0.2912
0.0765
-0.0309
0.1397
-0.0401
-0.0186
-0.0112
[0.0010]*** [0.0010]*** [0.0817]* [0.0980]* [0.0024]***
[0.4325]
[0.1494]
[0.8162]
INS (-)
-0.2509
-0.1764
0.0228
0.0323
-0.0559
-0.0453
0.0158
-0.0558
[0.0098]*** [0.0093]*** [0.6276]
[0.0002]*** [0.1791]
[0.3332]
[0.1398]
[0.1547]
INCENTIVE (+)
-0.0700
-0.0492
-0.0012
0.0121
-0.0293
-0.0057
0.0067
-0.0056
[0.0739]*
[0.0758]* [0.9383]
[0.0012]*** [0.1137]
[0.8661] [0.0182]** [0.8237]
Log-Likelihood
-374.8726
-321.2470
-349.3432
-327.8927
k
11
21
13
17
n
123
123
123
123
2
Note: 1. The variance of regression errors is assumed to be in the form Ti  exp B ax i in Specifications 2, 3, and 4.
2. * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.
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first part presents the empirical results for non-monitored firms. The second part discusses the
results for monitored firms.
4.4.1 Empirical Results for Non-monitored Firms
Table 4.3 provides the empirical estimation results for non-monitored firms. Likelihood
statistics suggest Specification 2 for analysis. From this regression, we are able to tell the
dominance between the signaling and agency cost models from the marginal effects (slopes,
hereafter). Specifically, STOCK has a significant and positive slope as hypothesized. This slope
supports the hypothesis that outside shareholders with more concentration of ownership are more
likely to influence insider behavior, thereby reducing agency costs and leading to a lower
dividend distribution. As hypothesized, INS has a significant and negative slope consistent with
agency-cost hypothesis. This slope is consistent with the hypothesis that outside equity holders
own a larger share of the equity, they will demand a higher dividend as part of the optimum
monitoring package. EXFFO has a significant and positive slope. The slope supports the
hypothesis that more cash flows give mangers more discretion to over-invest in non-positive net
present value projects in agency-cost explanations.
Although the slope of EXFFO also is consistent with the hypothesis that expected cash
flow increases dividend distribution, the slope cannot distinguish signaling explanations from
agency cost explanations. Without this EXFFO result, we have no other supporting evidence for
signaling explanations. Specifically, the three variables for expected cash flow volatility all have
insignificant and negative slopes. The slope of LEVER has a hypothesized sign, but the slopes
of MV and STATE have signs opposite to the hypotheses in signaling explanations.
To sum up, we have evidence supporting agency cost explanations but no distinct evidence
supporting signaling explanations for non-monitored firms. Therefore, the evidence indicates that
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agency cost explanations dominate signaling explanations when firms are not effectively
monitored. As hypothesized, this dominant relationship is reverse to the relationship documented
in the existing studies that do not take into account Easterbrook’s (1984) rationale or the
mandatory payout requirement for REITs.
4.4.2 Empirical Results for Monitored Firms
Table 4.4 exhibits the empirical estimation results for monitored firms. Likelihood statistics
again suggest Specification 2 for analysis. This specification provides mixed evidence for both
signaling and agency cost explanations. Although EXFFO has a significant and positive slope
consistent with both signaling and agency cost explanations, MV has a significant and negative
slope inconsistent with signaling explanations. This slope suggests that firms with lower cash
flow volatility pay out more dividend than firms with higher cash flow volatility. Nevertheless
this slope is consistent with agency cost explanations that do not have a determinate prediction
for the relationship between cash flow volatility and dividend distribution.
Again, STOCK has a significant and positive slope as hypothesized in agency cost
explanations. However, both GR and ROA have significant and positive slopes. The positive
slope of GR implies that a firm experiencing or anticipating a rapid growth would tend to
distribute more dividend. The positive slope of ROA implies that shareholders feel more pressure
to monitor the investment decisions of managers when the firm has a superior historical
investment performance. These two slopes are inconsistent with agency cost explanations.
To summarize, we have mixed evidence for both signaling and agency cost explanations for
monitored firms. There are two possible explanations for having the mixed evidence here. One
potential reason is that we do not have grouped monitored firms sufficiently well so that the
firms may still have sufficiently severe agency problem. The other likely reason is that other
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ways of maximizing shareholders’ wealth may provide more net benefit than signaling expected
cash flows or cash flow volatility. One such way is to balance corporate tax savings and
shareholders’ personal tax costs when REIT manager distribute dividends (Lee and Kau, 1987).
4.5 Conclusions
The REIT empirical literature offers two competing theories for the level of dividend
payouts under asymmetric information. WEG (1993) provide evidence supporting agency-cost
explanations for REIT dividend policy. On the other hand, BCS (1998) have evidence supporting
signaling explanations and argue that signaling explanations dominate agency-cost explanations
with evidence from cash flow volatility.
Neither WEG (1993) nor BCS (1998) consider either the mandatory 95% payout
requirement or Easterbrook’s (1984) monitoring rationale for paying dividends. By introducing
proxies for taxable income and monitoring, we provide evidence different from the evidence
provided by BCS (1998). In contrast to BCS (1998), our evidence suggests agency-cost
explanations dominate signaling explanations for dividends policy of inefficiently monitored
REITs.
4.6 References
Bradley, Michael, Dennis R. Capozza, and Paul J. Seguin. (1998). “Dividend policy and cashflow uncertainty,” Real Estate Economics 26, 555-580.
Brandon, David L. (1997). “Federal Taxation of Real Estate Investment Trusts,” in Garrigan and
Parsons (Ed.), Real Estate Investment Trusts: Structure, Analysis, and Strategy, McGraw-Hill,
New York, 83-130.
Eades, Kenneth M. (1982). “Empirical Evidence on Dividends as a Signal of Firm Value,” The
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 17, 471-500.
Easterbrook, Frank H. (1984). “Two agency-cost explanations of dividends,” The American
Economic Review 74, 650-659.

85

Filbeck, Greg, and Donald J. Mullineaux. (1993). “Regulatory monitoring and the impact of
banking holding company dividend changes on equity returns,” The Financial Review 28, 403415.
Filbeck, Greg, and Donald J. Mullineaux. (1999). “Agency costs and dividend payments: the
case of bank holding companies,” The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance 39, 409418.
Graham, Carol M., and John R. Knight. (2000). “Cash flows vs. earnings in the valuation of
equity REITs,” Journal of Real Estate Portfolio Management 6, 17-25.
Greene, William H. (2000). Econometric Analysis, fourth edition, New Jersey.
Internal Revenue Service. (2002). Instructions for Form 1120-REIT. Available:
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1120rei.pdf.
Kale, Jayant R. and Thomas H. Noe. (1990). “Dividends, uncertainty and underwriting costs
under asymmetric information,” The Journal of Financial Research 13, 265-277.
Lee, Cheng F. and James B Kau. (1987). “Dividend Payment Behavior and Dividend Policy on
REITs,” Quarterly Review of Economics and Business 27, 6-21.
Noronha, Gregory M., Dilip K. Shome, and George E. Morgan. (1996). “The monitoring
rationale for dividends and the interaction of capital structure and dividend decisions,” Journal
of Banking and Finance 20, 439-454.
Rozeff, Michael S. (1982). “Growth, beta and agency costs as determinants of dividend payout
ratios,” The Journal of Financial Research 5, 249-259.
Wang, Ko, John Erickson, and George W. Gau. (1993). “Dividend polices and dividend effects
for real estate investment trusts,” Journal of the American Real Estate and Urban Economics
Association 21, 185-201.

86

VITA
Ming-Long Lee received a Bachelor of Business Administration degree in International Trade
from the Soochow University in Taiwan in 1990. In 1993, after his two-year military service, he
matriculated in the University of South Australia in Adelaide, Australia, and received a Master of
Business degree in property in 1995. After working for a real estate appraisal firm and teaching at a
business college in Taiwan, he entered the doctoral program in business administration (Finance) at
Louisiana State University in 1998. He has articles published in the Journal of the Land Bank of
Taiwan and has an article to be published in a forthcoming issue of the Journal of Property Investment
and Finance. He will complete his doctoral degree in the summer of 2002.

87

